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EXHIBITS LIST

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS:
There was no hearing, so no reporter's transcript was taken.

EXHIBITS:
Claimant filed exhibits 1-5 with Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Declaratory
Ruling. Those exhibits are contained in the Agency's Record with the memorandum.
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT STATE OF IDAHO,
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO

******
GARY DAVIS,
Claimant,
vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,

I.C. No. 2005-501080

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF
A WARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS

Surety,

FI LED

and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,

JUN 2 6 2014
Industrial Commission

Defendants.

STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS - I

1·

J..~ i t ! '- ·
'

! j I

<, r r - 1
'_ !-1

l ,-- .) i

COME NOW Claimant, Gary Davis ("Claimant"), Hammack Management, Inc.
("Employer") and the State Insurance Fund ( "Surety") and the State ofldaho, Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund, ("ISIP"), by and through their respective attorneys, and hereby Stipulate to the
Entry of Award against Employer, Surety and the ISIP, hereafter collectively referred to as
"Defendants" in this case. This Stipulation is made upon the following grounds and for the
following reasons:
1.

On or about November 9, 2004, Claimant was employed by Employer and

earning approximately $400.00 per week as a maintenance man. On that date Claimant was
injured as a result of an accident occurring in the course and scope of his employment with
Employer (the "industrial injury").
2.

Employer, at the time of the industrial injury, was insured for its worker's

compensation liability by Surety under the laws of the State of Idaho.
3.

At the time of the industrial injury, Claimant was Thirty-Seven (37) years old and

married.
4.

Claimant has heretofore invoked the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission

("Commission") by duly serving Employer with his Complaint. Employer and Surety later
joined the ISIP. Defendants have duly filed and served their Answers and Affirmative Defenses.
5.

As a result of the industrial injury, Claimant suffered an injury to his low

back aggravating a pre-existing back condition and causing severe and permanent injuries as
more fully appears from the matters and papers on file with the Commission.
6.

Claimant contends and Defendants agree that Claimant suffered from and has

been disabled by certain injuries, diseases, and/or infirmities which pre-existed the industrial
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injury. ISIP stipulates and agrees that 1) Claimant suffered from permanent pre-existing
physical impairments relating to his cervical and lumbar spine, including impairments resulting
from four (4) lumbar surgeries prior to the industrial injury; 2) that his permanent pre-existing
physical impairments were manifest; 3) that his permanent pre-existing physical impairments
were hindrances and obstacles to employment; 4) that the industrial injury aggravated,
accelerated, and otherwise combined with his permanent pre-existing conditions; and 5) that
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled as a result of his permanent pre-existing conditions
and his industrial injury and relevant non-medical factors.
7.

Following the industrial injury, Claimant was examined and treated by numerous

physicians, both treating physicians and independent medical evaluators. Among the more
significant aspects of his medical course since the industrial injury are the following:
a.

3/1/05: 1) Bilateral revision laminectomy at 14-5, 2) Foraminotomy at 145 and 15-Sl, 3) Revision diskectomy at 14-5 and 15-Sl bilaterally, 4) 145 and 15-S 1 posterior lumbar interbody fusion, PCR interbody spacer,
iliac crest autograft, 5) 14-5 and 15-Sl posterolateral fusion with iliac
crest autograft, 6) Segmental pedicle screw instrumentation at 14-5 and
15-S 1, 7) Harvesting right iliac crest bone graft, 8) Use of operating
microscope, 9) Repair of durotomy. Performed by Dr. Jorgenson.

b.

10/27/05: 1) Bilateral 12-3, 13-4 laminectomy, 2) Exploration of the
lumbar spine. Performed by Dr. Jorgenson. Post-op complications:
Infection to left hip.

c.

8/23/07: 1) Removal of hardware, 14 to Sl, 2) Facet arthrodesis ofL4-5
and 15-Sl, 3) Re-do lumbar laminectomies, bilateral medial facetectomies
and foraminotomies, 12-3, 13-4, and 14-5, 4) Posterior lumbar interbody
fusion 13-4, 5) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation 12, 13, 14, 15 and
SI, 6) Posterolateral intersegmental fusion 12, 13 and 14, 7) Harvest of
left-sided iliac crest bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar.

d.

9/16/08: 1) Removal of hardware, 14 to Sl, 2) Assessment of arthrodesis
at 12-3, 13-4, 14-5, and 15-Sl, 3) Lumbar laminectomy with bilateral
medial facetectomies and fibraminotomies, including diskectomy at Ll-2
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L3-

8.

for bilateral spinal canal and neural decompression, 4) Re-do left sided
4 and L4-5 hemilaminotomy and medial facetectomies for spinal canal and
neural decompression, 5) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation Tl 0-12,
Ll-L5, and Sl, 6) Posterolateral intersegmental fusion ofT10-Tl2, LI and
L3. Performed by Dr. Hajjar.

e.

5/18/10: 1) Removal of hardware including Sl screws, 2) Assessment of
arthrodesis at L5-S1, 3) Re-do L5-S1 bilateral decompression and
laminotomy, 4) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation, L5-S1, 5)
Posterolateral intersegmental fusion, L5-S1, 6) Harvest of right-sided iliac
crest bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar.

f.

12/6/10: 1) Anterior cervical microdiskectomy at C4-5, C5-6 and C6-7 for
bilateral spinal canal and neural decompression, 2) Anterior cervical
interbody fusions C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7, 3) Anterior cervical plating, C45, 6 and 7, 4) Harvest of sternal bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar.

g.

2/14/13: C3 through 7 anterior cervical decompression and stabilization
and T7 through sacral fusion and instrumentation. Performed by Dr.
Hajjar.

Claimant's permanent partial impairments resulting from the industrial injury have

been rated by numerous physicians, both treating physicians and through the IME process. The
ratings for the industrial injury range from a high of 100% whole person impairment (Drs.
Fredrickson and Hajjar-both treating physicians) to a low of 22% whole person impairment

(IME ofDrs. Wilson and Frizzell). The parties stipulate and agree that October 1, 2013 shall be
designated as the date of medical stability and the date on which Claimant became totally and
permanently disabled ("MMI date").
9.

Following the industrial injury, and as a result thereof, Claimant was temporarily

disabled and has been paid all benefits due for such temporary disability through the MMI date
and has been paid all compensable medical benefits through the date hereof.
10.

Defendants hereby stipulate that Claimant had 32% aggregate whole person

permanent partial impairment before the industrial injury and that Claimant suffered an
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS - 4
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additional 27% whole person permanent partial impairment due to the industrial injury. As
Defendants stipulate that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, they agree to apportion
the nonmedical factors and the additional remaining permanent disability according to law.
Therefore, Employer accepts responsibility for paying 250 weeks of total and permanent
disability income benefits, commencing as of Claimant's MMI date, October 1, 2013.
11.

Starting October 1, 2013 and continuing for 250 weeks thereafter, unless

Claimant dies prior to the expiration of such 250-week period, Surety shall be responsible to pay
Claimant total and permanent disability income benefits in the amount of 55% of the average
weekly state wage for 2004, the year of the industrial injury, namely, $293.70 per week, subject
to the credit described in paragraph 12, below. Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is
entitled to be paid total and permanent disability benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average
weekly state wage pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 72-408 and 72-409. Therefore, the total and
permanent disability benefit rate for claimant for 2013 is $303.30 per week, and for 2014 is
$307.80 per week. The difference between Surety's obligation of $293. 70 per week and
Claimant's benefit rate of 45% of the prevailing average state weekly wage shall be paid by the

ISIP. Therefore, for the period of October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013, the ISIF will pay
to Claimant the sum of $9.60 per week. For the calendar year 2014, ISIP shall be obligated to
pay to Claimant the differential amount of $14.10 per week. At the expiration of said 250 week
period, subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12, below, the ISIP will pay Claimant his full
statutory income benefits, said amount being 45% of the then prevailing average state weekly
wage, until Claimant's death.
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12.

Surety has accepted aggregate permanent physical impairment ratings amounting

to 27% whole person impairment for the industrial injury and paid the benefits associated with
such ratings. In addition, Surety has paid Claimant benefits corresponding to 5% whole person
as an advance against permanent disability. These benefits, combined, amount to a total of 160
weeks. The amount paid by Surety to Claimant for the 160 weeks based on the combined total
of the 27% whole person PPI and 5% advance against permanent disability, amounts to $46,992.
Notwithstanding any other provision herein, Surety is entitled to a credit of 160 weeks, or
$46,992, against its obligation to pay 250 weeks of total and permanent disability benefits to
Claimant beginning October 1, 2013, leaving a total of 90 weeks of benefits to be paid by Surety.
13.

The Claimant retained Claimant's counsel to represent him in this worker's

compensation claim on or about 12/29/04. A Complaint was filed with the Industrial
Commission on or about 4/27/06. The parties stipulate and agree that the efforts of Claimant's
counsel have operated primarily and substantially to secure all of the worker's compensation
benefits that the Claimant has received in this worker's compensation claim since the date when
Claimant's counsel was retained on 12/29/04. Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0l(e),
Claimant's counsel shall be allowed to assert a charging lien of 25% against the Claimant's
worker's compensation benefits that are being paid pursuant to the terms of this stipulation.
However, after a period of 10 years from the date when the Claimant achieved MMI on 10/1/13
(I.e., on 10.1.23), the Claimant's attorney's charging lien shall be reduced from 25% down to
15% in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0l(e)(iii).
14.

All parties stipulate and agree that the Commission shall, on and by approval

hereof, be deemed to have fully adjudicated said accident as against Defendants, resultant
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injuries industrial in nature and origin, and all pre-existing disability, as provided by the
Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho.
15.

The above outlined payments, agreed to be paid by Defendants, are in

consideration for and in payment of any and all claims Claimant has, and may now or hereafter
make against Defendants and any of them for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Laws
of the State of Idaho, save and except for compensable medical benefits and medical services
related to the industrial accident. Approval of this Stipulation to Entry of Award by the
Commission shall fully and finally discharge Defendants from liability for any and all claims
Claimant has, and may now or hereafter have, including but not limited to every claim of
whatever nature or kind for total and permanent disability compensation and all other claims
Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Laws of
the State of Idaho, save and except for compensable medical benefits and medical services. This
is the case whether or not the full extent of Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or
claims is now known or foreseen, and regardless of whether Claimant shall ever again injure
himself in another or future accident, or otherwise, or suffer any disease which would arguably
cause the Defendants, or any of them, to be liable for additional claims or benefits under the laws
of the State of Idaho. This Stipulation shall, upon approval and entry of award by the Industrial
Commission, discharge the Defendants, and each of them, from liability for this and any other
and all claims forever, regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the
subject of this action or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or infirmities
existing prior to such accident or hereafter arising.
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16.

Upon Order of the Commission approving this Stipulation, and excepting only

payment of said sums by Defendants as aforesaid, Defendants and each of them shall be, and by
these presents are fully, finally and forever discharged and released of and from any and all
additional liability to Claimant on account of the above alleged accident, save and except for
Surety's responsibility for compensable medical benefits and medical services related to the
industrial accident, pursuant to law.
17.

Surety stipulates that it will continue to provide medical benefits and services to

Claimant for his industrial injuries, infirmities and conditions causally related to his industrial
llljury.
18.

The terms of this Stipulation shall be binding upon all of the undersigned parties,

their heirs, representatives, successors and assigns.
19.

All parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be

deemed to adjudicate said alleged accident, resultant injury and disability industrial in nature and
origin, and all pre-existing disability, as provided by the Worker's Compensation Laws of the
State of Idaho.
20.

The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for

and to be paid hereunder are the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if
this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for future medical care
causally related to the industrial injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for total
and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law.
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DATED this ~day of

J\llli\).,,

, 2014.

CLAIMANT:

JJ~~

-?ciARYDAVIS

STATEOFIDAHO )
:ss.
)
County of

Au\~

(

~

r ,

On this~ day of
2014, before me a Notary Public in and for said
State, personally appeared G YDAVIS, known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed in the above and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in the
certificate first above written.

q__
My Comm. Expires: _µ..............,V\,Ui~~--~Cj ,-'c1]~Ll......

lliclkfr~~
Attorney for Claimant
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'

.
STATE INSURANCE FUND

, Assis t Manager/Claims
Authorized Representative of Employer and S

As to form only:

INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND

Be~
r.....

..

Kenneth L. Mallea, Attorney for ISIF
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE

The foregoing Stipulation for Entry of A ward Against Defendants ("Stipulation") having
duly and regularly come before this Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and
the best interests of the parties are and will be served by approving said Stipulation and granting
the Order of Discharge as prayed for:

NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing Stipulation for Entry of Award Against
Defendants shall be, and the same hereby is APPROVED, and the Complaint in this matter is
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

r;)..p

day

of_'1~V_N_f____,2014.
INDUSTRJAL COMMISSION

By
Chairman

!~017 011
Member

ATTEST:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J.1L

J

day of VN(
, 2014, a true and
I hereby certify that on the
correct copy of STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL was served by United States Mail upon each of the following:

Rick D. Kallas
1031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, ID 83712
Attorney for Claimant
JonMBauman
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Attorney for Employer/Surety
Kenneth L. Mallea
P OBox 857
Meridian, ID 83680-0857
. Attorney for Defendant ISIF

Verlene Wise/James F. Kile
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-7901
Defendant ISIF

----·

4842-2787-2282, v. I
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Rick D. Kallas
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
E-mail:
rdk@greyhawklaw.com

0
;
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RECEIVED

STRIAL COMMISSION

Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,

LC. No. 2005 - 501080

Claimant,
vs.

HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,
and

CLAIMANT'S PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING WHICH
INTERPRETS AND CLARIFIES THE
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF
A WARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND
DISCHARGE ENTERED BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON 6.26.14

IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.
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COMES NOW Claimant, Gary Davis, and pursuant to J.R.P. 15, hereby requests that the

Industrial Commission enter a Declaratory Ruling which interprets the rights, duties and
obligations of the parties pursuant to the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants and
the Order of Approval and Discharge entered by the Industrial Commission on 6.26.14.
(A)

Issues in Dispute.

The following issues are in dispute and require a Declaratory Ruling:
1.

Whether the $39,649.50 invalid PPI credit granted to Employer for the 27% whole person
PPI award previously paid to Claimant before the parties stipulated that Claimant was
totally and permanently disabled is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711 and the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150
(2014) because it deprives the Claimant of the full measure of his statutory total and
permanent disability (TPD) benefits and does not "conform to the provisions of this
law"?

2.

Whether the $39,649.50 invalid credit taken by Employer for the 27% whole person PPI
award previously paid to Claimant before the parties stipulated that Claimant was totally
and permanently disabled is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(1) and the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150
(2014) because it unfairly relieves Employer in whole or in part from its liability to pay
the Claimant the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits pursuant to the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Act?

3.

Whether the $39,649.50 invalid credit taken by Employer for the 27% whole person PPI
award previously paid to Claimant before the parties stipulated that Claimant was totally
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and permanently disabled is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(2) and the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150
(2014) because it unfairly requires the Claimant to waive his right to receive the full
measure of his statutory TPD benefits under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act?
4.

Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must begin paying the Claimant his full .
statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the currently applicable average weekly state 90
weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13 pursuant to the unambiguous terms of
the Stipulation which made ISIP liability "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph
12"?

5.

Whether the Stipulation is ambiguous when defining the date when the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund's obligation to pay full statutory TPD benefits would begin and whether
that ambiguity should be construed against the ISIP and in favor of the Claimant since the
ISIP drafted the language of the Stipulation?

6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees from Employer and ISIP
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 because Employer and ISIP have both contested the
Claimant's claim for the full measure of his TPD benefits that he is entitled to receive
pursuant to the Act and the Stipulation without reasonable grounds?

(B)

An Actual Controversy Exists With Both Defendants

1.

The Claimant wrote to Employer on 1.15 .15 and asked Employer to either reimburse the
Claimant for the $39,649.50 invalid PPI credit that it took against the Claimant's TPD
benefits or stipulate to amend the 6.26.14 Stipulation in order to eliminate the credit.
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Employer denied both requests on 1.20 .15. Therefore, an actual controversy exists with
Employer over the validity of its taking the illegal credit for PPI benefits previously paid.
2.

The Claimant wrote to ISIP on 2.2.15 and asked ISIP to confirm in writing that it would
begin paying Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the currently
applicable A WSW beginning 90 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13 in
accordance with the express language of the Stipulation. The ISIF responded to the
Claimant's 2.2.15 letter on 2.5 .15 and denied the Claimant's requests.

Therefore, an

actual controversy exists with ISIF over the date when its obligation to pay the Claimant
his full statutory total and permanent disability benefits begins.
(C)

The Claimant's Interest in Receiving Full Statutory TPD Benefits is at Stake
The Claimant has an interest in collecting his full statutory TPD benefits based on the

statutory rate of 45% of the currently applicable average weekly state wage from the stipulated
date of MMI on 10.1.13 until the date he dies based on the stated purpose of the Stipulation and
the provisions of the Act.
If Employer stops paying its 55% share of the Claimant's TPD disability benefits after 90
weeks based on its invalid PPI credit and the ISIF refuses to begin paying the Claimant his full
statutory benefits until after 250 weeks from the stipulated date ofMMI on 10.1.13, the Claimant
will go 160 weeks or more than 3 years without collecting his full statutory TPD benefits in
direct violation of the stated purpose of the stipulation and the substantive provisions of Idaho's
workers' compensation Act.
This Petition For Declaratory Ruling is based on the express terms of the Stipulation and
Order entered on 6.26.14, the facts and legal authorities cited in the Claimant's Memorandum In
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Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling (including Exhibits No. 1-5), the sworn statements of
Claimant in his Affidavit In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling (Ex. 5) and the
provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. A copy of the 6.26.14 Stipulation and
Order and Approval of Discharge is attached to this Petiition.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of February 2015.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

~1),~

By:

RlCKD~LAS~
Attorney for Claimant

Certificate of Service

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February 2015, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling by the method indicated below
upon the following persons:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

[ X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.888.2789

Jon M. Bauman
Elam&Burke
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile@ 208.384.5844
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Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
78 SW 5th Avenue
P. O.Box 857
Meridian Idaho 83680-0857
Telephone: (208) 888-2790
ISB No. 2397
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AITORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT STATE OF IDAHO,
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO

******
GARY DAVIS,
Claimant,

vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,

I.C. No. 2005-501080

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF
AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS

Surety,
and

FI LED

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,

JUN 2 6 2014
!ndustrial Commisskin

Defendants.
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COME NOW Claimant, Gary Davis ("Claimant"), Hammack Management, Inc.
("Employer,,) and the State Insurance Fund ( "Surety,,) and the State of Idaho, Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund, ("ISIF"), by and through their respective attorneys, and hereby Stipulate to the
Entry of Award against Employer, Surety and the ISIP, hereafter collectively referred to as
''Defendants" in this case. This Stipulation is made upon the following grounds and for the
following reasons:
I.

On or about November 9, 2004, Claimant was employed by Employer and

earning approximately $400.00 per week as a maintenance man. On that date Claimant was
injured as a result of an accident occurring in the course and scope of his employment with
Employer (the "industrial injury,,).
2.

Employer, at the time of the industrial iajury, was insured for its worker's

compensation liability by Surety under the laws of the State ofldaho.
3.

At the time of the industrial injury, Claimant was Thirty-Seven (37) years old and

married.
4.

Claimant has heretofore invoked the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission

("Commission") by duly serving Employer with his Complaint. Employer and Surety later
joined the ISIF. Defendants have duly filed and served their Answers and Affirmative Defenses.

5.

As a result of the industrial injury, Claimant suffered an injury to his low

back aggravating a pre-existing back condition and causing severe and permanent injuries as
more fully appears from the matters and papers on file with the Commission.
6.

Claimant contends and Defendants agree that Claimant suffered from and has

been disabled by certain injuries, diseases, and/or infinnities which pre-existed the industrial ·
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS- 2
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injury. ISIF stipulates and agrees that 1) Claimant suffered from permanent pre-existing
physical impainnents relating to his cervica] and lumbar spine, including impainnents resulting
from four (4) lumbar surgeries prior to the industrial injury; 2) that his permanent pre-existing

physical impairments were manifest; 3) that his permanent pre-existing physical impairments
were hindrances and obstacles to employment; 4) that the industrial injury aggravated,
accelerated, and otherwise combined with his permanent pre-existing conditions; and 5) that
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled as a result of his permanent pre-existing conditions
and his industrial injury and relevant non-medical factors.
7.

Following the industrial injury, Claimant was examined and treated by numerous

physicians, both treating physicians and independent medical evaluators. Among the more
significant aspects of his medical course since the industrial injury are the following:
a.

3/1/05: 1) Bilateral revision laminectomy at L4-5, 2) Foraminotomy at L45 and L5-S1, 3) Revision diskectomy at L4-5 and L5-S1 bilaterally, 4) L45 and LS-SI posterior lumbar interbody fusion, PCR interbody spacer,
iliac crest autograft, 5) L4-5 and LS-SI posterolateral fusion with iliac
crest autograft, 6) Segmental pedicle screw instrumentation at L4-5 and
L5-S I, 7) Harvesting right iliac crest bone graft, 8) Use of operating
microscope, 9) Repair of durotomy. Performed by Dr. Jorgenson.

b.

10/27/05: I) Bilateral L2-3, L3-4 laminectomy, 2) Exploration of the
lumbar spine. Performed by Dr. Jorgenson. Post-op complications:
Infection to left hip.

c.

8/23/07: I) Removal of hardware, 14 to S 1, 2) Facet arthrodesis of L4-5
and LS-SI, 3) Re-do lumbar laminectomies, bilateral medial facetectomies
and foraminotomies, L2-3, L3-4, and L4-5, 4) Posterior lumbar interbody
fusion L3-4, 5) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation L2, L3, L4, LS and
S 1, 6) Posterolateral intersegmental fusion 12, L3 and L4, 7) Harvest of
left-sided iliac crest bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar.

d.

9/16/08: 1) Removal of hardware, 14 to Sl, 2) Assessment of arthrodesis
at L2-3, L3-4, L4-5, and LS-SI, 3) Lumbar Iaminectomy with bilateral
medial facetectomies and fibraminotomies, including diskectomy at LI-2
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L3-

8.

for bilateral spinal canal and neural decompression, 4) Re-do left sided
4 and L4-5 hemilaminotomy and medial facetectomies for spinal canal and
neural decompression, 5) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation TI0-12,
Ll-L5, and Sl, 6) Posterolateral intersegmental fusion ofTIO-Tl2, L1 and
L3. Performed by Dr. Hajjar.

e.

5/18/10: 1) Removal of hardware including SI screws, 2) Assessment of
arthrodesis at L5-S1, 3) Re-do LS-SI bilateral decompression and
laminotomy, 4) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation, LS-Sl, 5)
Posterolateral intersegmental fusion, LS-SI, 6) Harvest ofright-sided iliac
crest bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar.

f.

12/6/10: I) Anterior cervical microdiskectomy at C4-5, CS-6 and C6-7 for
bilateral spinal canal and neural decompression, 2) Anterior cervical
interbody fusions C4-5, CS-6, and C6-7, 3) Anterior cervical plating, C45, 6 and 7, 4) Harvest of sternal bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar.

g.

2/14/13: C3 through 7 anterior cervical decompression and stabilization
and T7 through sacral fusion and instrumentation. Performed by Dr.
Hajjar.

Claimant's permanent partial impairments resulting from the industrial injury have

been rated by numerous physicians, both treating physicians and through the IME process. The
ratings for the industrial injmy range from a high of I 00% whole person impairment (Drs.
Fredrickson and Hajjar-both treating physicians) to a low of22% whole person impainnent
j

(IME ofDrs. Wilson and Frizzell). The parties stipulate and agree that October 1, 2013 shall be
designated as the date of medical stability and the date on which Claimant became totally and
pennanently disabled ("MMI date").
9.

Following the industrial injury, and as a result thereof, Claimant was temporarily

disabled and has been paid all benefits due for such temporary disability through the MMI date
and has been paid all compensable medical benefits through the date hereof.
. 10.

Defendants hereby stipulate that Claimant had 32% aggregate whole person

pennanent partial impairment before the industrial injury and that Claimant suffered an
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS - 4
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additional 27% whole person pennanent partial impainnent due to the industrial irtjury. As
Defendants stipulate that Claimant is totally and pennanently disabled, they agree to apportion
the nonmedical factors and the additional remaining pennanent disability according to law.
Therefore, Employer accepts responsibility for paying 250 weeks of total and permanent
disability income benefits, commencing as of Claimant's MMI date, October I, 2013.
11.

Starting October l, 2013 and continuing for250 weeks thereafter, unless

Claimant dies prior to the expiration of such 250-week period, Surety shall be responsible to pay
Claimant total and permanent disability income benefits in the amount of 55% of the average
weekly state wage for 2004, the year of the industrial injury, namely, $293.70 per week, subject
to the credit described in paragraph 12, below. Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is
entitled to be paid total and permanent disability benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average
weekly state wage pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 72-408 and 72-409. Therefore, the total and
pennanent disability benefit rate for claimant for2013 is $303.30 per week, and for 2014 is

-$307.80 per week. The difference between Surety's obligation of $293,70 per week and
Claimant's benefit rate of 45% of the prevailing average state weekly~age shall be paid by the
ISIF. Therefore, for the period of October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013, the ISIF will pay
to Claimant the sum of $9.60 per week. For the calendar year 2014, ISIF shall be obligated to

pay to Claimant the differential amount of$14.10 per week. At the expiration of said 250 week
period, subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12, below, the ISIF will pay Claimant his full
statutory income benefits, said amowit being 45% of the then prevailing average state weekly
wage, until Claimant's death.

STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS- 5
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12.

Surety has accepted aggregate permanent physical impairment ratings amounting

to 27% whole person impairment for the industrial injury and paid the benefits associated with
such ratings. In addition, Surety has paid Claimant benefits corresponding to 5% whole person
as an advance against permanent disability. These benefits, combined, amount to a total of 160
weeks. The amount paid by Surety to Claimant for the 160 weeks based on the combined total
of the 27% whole person PPI and 5% advance against permanent disability, amounts to $46,99......__ _ _ __
Notwithstanding any other provision herein, Surety is entitled to a credit of I 60 weeks, or
$46,992, against its obligation to pay 250 weeks of total and permanent disability benefits to
Claimant beginning October l, 2013, leaving a total of90 weeks of benefits to be paid by Surety.
13.

The Claimant retained Claimant's counsel to represent him in this worker's

compensation claim on or about 12/29/04. A Complaint was filed with the Industrial
Commission on or about 4/27/06. The parties stipulate and agree that the efforts of Claimant's
counsel have operated primarily and substantially to secure all of the worker's compensation
benefits that the Claimant has received in this worker's compensation claim since the date when
Claimant's counsel was retained on 12/29/04. Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0l(e),
Claimant's counsel shall be allowed to assert a charging lien of25% against the Claimant's
workers compensation benefits that are being paid pursuant to the terms of this stipulation.
However, after a period of 10 years from the date when the Claimant achieved MMI on I 0/1/13
(I.e., on I 0.1.23), the Claimant's attorney's charging lien shall be reduced from 25% down to
15% in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0I(e)(iii).
14.

All parties stipulate and agree that the Commission shall, on and by approval

hereof, be deemed to have fully adjudicated said accident as against Defendants, resultant
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS - 6
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injuries industrial in nature and origin, and all pre-existing disability, as provided by the
Worker's Compensation Laws of the State ofldaho.
15.

The above outlined payments, agreed to be paid by Defendants, are in

consideration for and in payment of any and all claims Claimant has, and may now or hereafter
make against Defendants and any of them for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Laws
of the State ofidaho, save and except for compensable medical benefits and medical services
related to the industrial accident. Approval of this Stipulation to Entry of Award by the
Commission shall fully and finally discharge Defendants from liability for any and all claims
Claimant has, and may now or hereafter have, including but not limited to every claim of
whatever nature or kind for total and permanent disability compensation and all other claims
Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Laws of
the State ofldaho, save and except for compensable medical benefits and medical services. This
is the case whether or not the full extent of Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or
claims is now known or foreseen, and regardless of whether Claimant shall ever again injure
himself in another or future accident, or otherwise, or suffer any disease which would arguably
cause the Defendants, or any of them, to be liable for additional claims or benefits under the laws
of the State ofldaho. This Stipulation shall, upon approval and entry of award by the Industrial
Commission, discharge the Defendants, and each of them, from liability for this and any other
and all claims forever, regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the
subject of this action or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impainnents, disabilities or in:finnities
existing prior to such accident or hereafter arising.
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Upon Order of the Commission approving this Stipulation, and excepting only

payment of said sums by Defendants as aforesaid, Defendants and each of them shall be, and by
these presents are fully, finally and forever discharged and released of and from any and all
additional liability to Claimant on account of the above alleged accident, save and except for
Surety's responsibility for compensable medical benefits and medical services related to the
industrial accident, pursuant to law.
17.

Surety stipulates that it will continue to provide medical benefits and services to

Claimant for Ws industrial injuries, infirmities and conditions causally related to his industrial
injury.
18.

The terms of this Stipulation shall be binding upon all of the undersigned parties,

their heirs, representatives, successors and assigns.
19.

AU parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be
/, ~\

\.'

deemed to adjudicate said aJleged accident, resultant injury and disahility industrial in nature and
origin, and all pre-existing disability, as provided by the Worker's Compensation Laws of the
State ofldaho.
20.

The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for

and to be paid hereunder are the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if
this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for future medical care
causally related to the industrial injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for total
and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to Jaw.
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DATED this i,t'day of

J!A\U.,

, 2014.

CLAIMANT:

STATEOFIDAHO )
A.J
:ss.
County of .....
.q!l\-t--"-'~"--- )
On this ~day o ~
, 2014, before me a Notary Public in and for said
State, personally appeared
YDAVIS, known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed in the above and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in the
certificate first above written.

My Comm. Expires:

fl

n,\~ 5I oblg

ru.&&o®J
Attorney for Claimant
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~E~
By:

~ager/Claims
Authorized Representative of Employer and S

As to form only:

INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND

Kenneth L. Mallea, Attorney for ISIF
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE
The foregoing Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants ("Stipulation") having
duly and regularly come before this Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and
the best interests of the parties are and will be served by approving said Stipulation and granting
the Order of Discharge as prayed for:

NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing Stipulation for Entry of Award Against
Defendants shall be, and the same hereby is APPROVED, and the Complaint in this matter is
dismissed with prejudice.

f____., 2014.

DATED this JJf!_ day of.....;J.._V...;_~......

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

By

ATTEST:

.
.g"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

. 2014, a true and
I hereby certify that on the jJ,j__ day of JVN(
correct copy of STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL was served by United States Mail upon each of the following:
Rick D. Kallas
I031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, ID 83712
Attorneyfar Claimant
JonMBauman
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Attorney for Employer/Surety
Kenneth L. Mallea
P0Box857
Meridian, ID 83680-0857
Attorneyfor Defendant ISIF
Verlene Wise/James F. Kile
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
PO Box83720
Boise, ID 83720-7901
Defendant ISJF

----4842-2787-2282, v. I
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Rick D. Kallas
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
E-mail:
rdk@greyhawklaw.com
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Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
I.C. No. 2005 - 501080
Claimant,
vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,

CLAIMANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

and
IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND,
. Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.
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Gary Davis, the Claimant, being first duly sworn on oath, states as follows:
1.

I am the Claimant in this case and make this affidavit based on my own personal
knowledge.

2.

Before I signed the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against the Defendants in my case on
June 6, 2014, I sat down in my attorney's office and read the Stipulation. At that time, it
was my understanding that the State Insurance Fund had agreed to pay its share of my
total and permanent disability benefits for 250 weeks after the date when the parties
stipulated that I reached maximum medical improvement on October 1, 2013. However,
based on the language of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation, I understood that the
State Insurance Fund was taking a credit against its obligation to pay 250 weeks worth of
TPD benefits based on the 27% PPI award that it had paid to me and the 5% disability
above impairment award it had paid to me before the parties stipulated that I was totally
and permanently disabled by my industrial injury.

3.

After the State Insurance Fund took the credits described in paragraph 12 of the
Stipulation, I knew that it would stop paying me its share of my TPD benefits 90 weeks
after October 1, 2013. However, I was not concerned about losing those payments from
the State Insurance Fund because it was my understanding that the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund would begin paying my full statutory total and permanent disability
benefits based on 45% of the current Average Weekly State Wage when the State
Insurance Fund stopped making its payments. It did not matter to me who paid my
benefits as long as I continued to receive the full measure of my benefits based on 45% of
the current Average Weekly State Wage.
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4.

My understanding that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would begin paying my full
statutory total and permanent disability benefits based on 45% of the current Average
Weel<ly State Wage after 90 weeks was based on the plain language of paragraph 11
which said that the State Insurance Fund's obligation to pay me was "subject to the
credit" in paragraph 12 and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund's obligation was also
"subject to the credit" in paragraph 12. In my mind, that meant that when the State
Insurance Fund's obligation stopped after 90 weeks, the Industrial Special Indemnity
Fund's obligation to pay full benefits would start.

5.

IfI would have known that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would take the position
that it did not have to start paying me my full statutory total and permanent disability
benefits until after 250 weeks, I never would have signed the Stipulation since it would
require me to waive my right to receive the full measure of my statutory total and
permanent disability benefits for more than 3 years from week 90 to week 250.

6.

I cannot live and pay my bills based on the small differential payment that I will receive
from the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund based on the difference between 45% of the
current Average Weel<ly State Wage and 55% of the Average Weekly State Wage for the
year that I was injured back in 2004.

7.

Based on 45% of the Average Weekly State Wage in 2015, that differential payment is
only $16.35 per week or $65.40 per month. After paying my attorney 25%, I will only
receive $49.05 per month.

8.

I cannot live and pay my bills on $49.05 per month. Therefore, I am asking the Industrial
Commission to not allow the State Insurance Fund to take the invalid credit for the 27%
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whole person PPI award that it previously paid to me. I understand that the State
Insurance Fund is legally entitled to take a credit for the 5% disability above impairment
benefits that it paid to me on a voluntary basis and I do not have any objection to that
credit.
9.

If the Industrial Commission is going to allow the State Insurance Fund to take the 27%

PPI credit, then I would ask the Industrial Commission to require the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund to begin paying full statutory benefits based on 45% of the current
Average Weekly State Wage when the State Insurance Fund payments stop after 90
weeks from October 1, 2013.
10.

If the State Insurance Fund is allowed to stop making payments after 90 weeks from
10.1.13 but the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund does not have to start paying my full
statutory benefits until 250 weeks after 10.1.13, I will not be able to survive on the small
differential payment from the ISIP for more than 3 years.
Further your Affiant Sayeth Naught.

Dated this 25th day of February, 2015.
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SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN TO before me this 25th day of February, 2015

County of Ada

)

State of Idaho

)

: S.S.

NotPublic For Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires:

lt\Qt!M\yY

loJ o'Olt?/

Certificate of Service

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February 2015, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of Claimant's Affidavit In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling by the
method indicated below upon the following persons:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

[ X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.888.2789

Jon M. Bauman
Elam& Burke
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile@ 208.384.5844

Davis/ Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling

PAGE5

34

Rick D. Kallas
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
E-mail:
rdk@greyhawklaw.com
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Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,

LC. No. 2005 - 501080

Claimant,
CLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.
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(A)

BACKGROUND FACTS

The Claimant and the Defendants entered into a Stipulation For Entry of Award
Against Defendants that the Industrial Commission entered as an Order of Approval and
Discharge on 6.26.14. The stated purpose of the Stipulation was to provide the Claimant
with "the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if this matter
proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for future medical care
causally related to the industrial injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for
total and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law" (See if20 on page 8 of
the Stipulation).
Based on application of the formula announced in Carey v. Clearwater County
Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984), Employer agreed to pay Claimant

250 weeks of benefits at 55% of the average weekly state wage for the year that Claimant
was injured in 2004 starting on 10.1.13 (See

,r

10 of the Stipulation).

However,

Employer's obligation to pay Claimant 250 weeks of benefits was "subject to the credit
described in paragraph 12, below" which shortened Employer's liability for total and
permanent disability (TPD) benefits from 250 weeks down to 90 weeks (See ifl 1 of the
Stipulation).
Paragraph 12 gave Employer 2 credits: (1) an invalid credit of 135 weeks for the
27% whole person PPI award that Employer paid to Claimant prior to the date when the
parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled (i.e., 27% X 500
weeks= 135 weeks X 55% of 2004 AWSW of $293.70 = $39,649.50); and (2) a valid
credit of 25 weeks based on the 5% disability in excess of impairment benefits that
Employer paid to Claimant on a voluntary basis pursuant to an 11.6.12 Stipulation
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Regarding Advance of Benefits (i.e., 5% X 500 weeks = 25 weeks X 2004 AWSW of
$293.70 = $7,342.50)

1
•

The total combined credit claimed by Employer in paragraph 12

is $39,649.50 + $7,342.50 = $46,992.00.
A mere 60 days after the Industrial Commission entered its Order of Approval
and Discharge in this case on 6.26.14, the Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) on 8.25.14. The
Corgatelli Court held that there is no statutory basis under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act to give Employer credit for PPI benefits paid prior to a determination
that the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled.
Based on the holding in Corgatelli and the provisions of the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act, the Claimant wrote to Employer on 1.22.15 and asked Employer to
either reimburse him for the invalid credit that it took against his TPD benefits for the PPI
benefits previously paid or stipulate to amend the 6.26.14 Stipulation to eliminate the
invalid credit (See Ex. 1). Employer responded on 1.20.15 and rejected both requests
(See Ex. 2).
After Employer made it clear that it would stop paying Claimant' its share of his
TPD benefits at the expiration of 90 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13,
the Claimant wrote to ISIP on 2.2.15 and asked the ISIP to confirm in writing that it
would begin paying the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits at 45% of the currently
applicable A WSW after the expiration of 90 weeks from the stipulated date of MMI on
10.1.13 (See Ex. 3).

1

The Claimant concedes that Employer is entitled to claim the 25-week credit of $7,342.50 for the disability in excess
of impairment payments that Employer made on a voluntary basis pursuant to the 11.6.12 Stipulation.
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Even though the ISIF's obligation to pay Claimant the full measure of his
statutory TPD benefits was "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12, below"
which shortened the ISIP payment obligation from 250 weeks to 90 weeks (See if 11 of
the Stipulation), the ISIP responded to the Claimant's 2.2.15 request on 2.5.15 and
refused to confirm that it would begin paying the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefit
of 45% of the currently applicable A WSW at the expiration of 90 weeks after the
stipulated date ofMMI on 10.1.13 (See Ex. 4).
Based on the Employer's unconscionable position that is entitled to claim a
invalid credit in violation of the Claimant's substantive rights under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act and the ISIP's unconscionable position that its obligation to pay
Claimant the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits is not "subject to" the credit even
though the Stipulation clearly indicates otherwise, the Claimant has been placed in the
unjustified position of being deprived of the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits
for more than 3 years or 160 weeks from week 90 to week 250.
The Claimant cannot afford to purchase the basic necessities of life for more than
3 years between week 90 and week 250 based on the small differential payment that he
will receive from the ISIP based on the difference between 55% of the A WSW in 2004 of
$293.70 and 45% of the currently applicable A WSW (See Ex. 5). In 2015, the small
differential payment made by ISIP is $16.35 per week calculated as follows: 45% of
2015 A WSW= $310.05 - 55% of 2004 AWSW of $293.70 = $16.35 per week X 4 =
$65.40 per month. After paying a 25% attorney's fee, the Claimant will only receive
$49.05 per month. The Claimant cannot survive on $49.05 per month (See Ex. 5).
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(B)
1.

ARGUMENT

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISION SHOULD DECLARE THE INVALID PPI
CREDIT CLAIMED BY EMPLOYER VOID UNDER THE ACT
The Stipulation approved by the Commission on 6.26.14 gives Employer a credit

for the 27% whole person PPI award that Employer paid to Claimant prior to the date
when the parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled.
However, in Cogatelli, the Court held that there was no statutory basis for the
Commission to give Employer a credit for PPI benefits previously paid in a total and
permanent disability case:
Examining worker's compensation law as a whole, Roe v. Albertson's Inc.,
141 Idaho 524, 528, 112 P.3d 812, 816 (2005), this Court finds that there
is no statutory basis for the Commission to award Steel West a credit for
permanent physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli ....
Thus, the current version of Idaho Code section 72-408, which provides
for the employee such as Corgatelli to receive total and permanent
disability benefits, includes no deduction or credit for previously paid
permanent impairment benefits in its award of disability benefits. . ..
No other statute in Idaho's worker's compensation law permits the
employer to receive credit for permanent physical impairment benefits
paid before the award of total and permanent disability benefits. As a
purely statutory scheme, the Court cannot judicially construct a credit for
employers into worker's compensation law. Corgatelli, 335 P.3d 1155.
Even before the Corgatelli decision was published on 8.25.14, there was no
statutory basis for the Commission to award Employer a $39,649.50 PPI credit against its
obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits. Therefore,
the Commission acted beyond the authority or jurisdiction granted to it by statute when it
awarded Employer the invalid PPI credit in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-711 and
Idaho Code §72-318. Neither the Commission nor the Supreme Court is authorized to
judicially construct a credit that does not exist under the provisions of the Act.
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The Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants approved the
Commission on 6.26.14 was basically a Compensation Agreement which is authorized by
Idaho Code §72-711 - Compensation agreements.

However, that statute expressly

provides that the Commission does not have authority to approve an agreement which
does not conform to the provisions of the worker's compensation act:
72-711. Compensation agreements. If the employer and the afflicted
employee reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this law, a
memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with the commission, and, if
approved by it, thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be an
award by the commission and be enforceable under the provisions of
section 72-735, unless modified as provided in section 72-719. An
agreement shall be approved by the commission only when the terms
conform to the provisions of this law.
Even before the Supreme Court entered its holding in Cortagelli on 8.25.14, the
PPI credit approved by the Commission in this case on 6.26.14 was invalid because it did
not "conform to the provisions of this law". Therefore, the Commission did not have the
authority or jurisdiction to approve those provisions of the Stipulation which granted
Employer the invalid credit.
The Commission should rectify the injustice created by giving Employer the
invalid credit by entering a declaratory ruling that the PPI credit claimed by Employer is
void and require Employer to pay 55% of the average weekly state wage of 2004 or
$293.70 for a period of 225 weeks beginning on the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13
(i.e., 250 weeks - 25 week credit for the PPD in excess of PPI benefits that Employer
paid on a voluntary basis pursuant to the 11.6.12 Stipulation= 225 weeks of TPD liability
for Employer).
If the Commission does not declare the credit void and allows Employer to claim

the invalid credit, it will be relieving Employer of its obligation to pay Claimant the full
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measure of his TPD benefits and it will be requiring the Claimant to waive his right to
receive the full measure of his TPD benefits in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-318 Invalid Agreements - Penalty which provides in pertinent part:
(1) No agreement ... or any contract, rule regulation or device whatever
designed to relieve the employer in whole or in part from any liability
created by this law, shall be valid.
(2) No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation
under this act shall be valid.
Since there was no statutory basis to support the Commission giving Employer a
$39,649.50 invalid credit for PPI benefits previously paid, the credit described in
paragraphs 11-12 of the stipulation must be declared void because it "relieves the
employer in whole or part from any liability created by this law" (See LC. §72-318(1))
and it requires the "employee to waive his rights to compensation under this act" (See
§72-318(2)).
When reviewing the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, the Commission should
give the Act a liberal reading in favor of providing the injured worker with the full
measure of the compensation that the Act promises to him:
When interpreting the Act, we must liberally construe its provisions in favor of the
employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was promulgated. Reese v. VJ Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 115 P.3d 721, 724 (2005); Davaz v. Priest River Glass
Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994). The Act is designed to provide
sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families and dependents. Davaz, 125
Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296; LC. § 72-201. The primary objective of an award of
permanent disability benefits is to compensate the claimant for his or her loss of earning
capacity. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296. The purposes served by the Act
leave no room for narrow technical constructions. Reese, 141 Idaho at 633, 115 P.3d at
724. Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d
1008, 1113 (2009).
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The Wernecke Court emphasized the important public policy of making sure that
the injured worker receives the full measure of the benefits that he is entitled to receive
under the Act:

Claimants and ISIF do not have absolute freedom to contract because the
duties of the parties arise under the Act. As one worker's compensation
expert states in his treatise:
it must be stressed that the objective of the legislation is not to see how
much money can be transferred to workers as a class; it is to ensure that
those with truly compensable claims get full compensation. If there is
doubt about the compensability of the claim, the solution is not to send the
claimant away half-compensated, but to let the Compensation Board
decide the issue. That is the Board's job.
8 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW§ 132.04[2] (2008) Id. 147 Idaho 285,207 P.3d 1016.
Because there was no statutory basis for the Commission approve the invalid PPI
credit and allowing the credit to remain in effect would relieve Employer of its obligation
to pay full compensation under the Act and would require the Claimant to waive the full
measure of the TPD benefits that he is entitled to under the Act and the Stipulation, the
Commission should declare the PPI credit provisions in paragraph 11 and 12 void under
Idaho Code §72-318 and order Employer to pay the Claimant 55% of the AWSW for
2004 for 225 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13.
(2)

THE UNAMBIGUOUS PHRASE "SUBJECT TO THE CREDIT" SHOULD BE
GIVEN ITS PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING TO DEFINE THE DATE
WHEN EMPLOYER'S PAYMENT OBLIGATION ENDS AND THE DATE
WHEN THE ISIF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FULL STATUTORY BENEFITS
BEGINS
If the Commission does not declare the invalid PPI credit given to Employer in

paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation void and require the Employer to pay the full
measure of its share of the Claimant's TPD benefits for 225 weeks after the stipulated
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date of MMI on 10.1.13, the Commission should give the plain and ordinary meaning to
the phrase "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12" and enter a declaratory ruling
which requires the ISIF to begin paying the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits
based on 45% of the currently applicable AWSW 90 weeks after the date of MMI on
10.1.13 because the ISIP expressly stated in the Stipulation that its obligation to pay full
statutory TPD benefits was "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12".
The ISIF's obligation to pay the Claimant full statutory TPD benefits based on
45% of the then currently applicable A WSW is set forth in paragraph 11 of the
Stipulation:
At the expiration of said 250 week period, subject to the credit discussed
in paragraph 12, below, the ISIP will pay Claimant his full statutory
income benefits, said amount being 45% of the then prevailing average
state weekly wage, until Claimant's death (italics supplied).
The phrase "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12" means that the ISIF's
obligation to begin making full statutory TPD benefits would begin after 90 weeks
because the ISIP expressly stated that its obligation to pay full statutory TPD benefits at
45% of the A WSW was "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" the credit
granted to Employer in paragraph 12.
There is no Idaho Supreme Court decision directly on point which defines the
meaning of the phrase "subject to". However, that common phrase is used throughout the
Idaho Workers' Compensation Act as being synonymous with "controlled by" or
"governed by". For example, in Idaho Code §72-303, the qualifications of a Surety are
"subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" regulations that have been promulgated
by the Director of the Department of Insurance. In Idaho Code §72-603, the Employers
duty to keep and maintain accurate employee records is "subject to" or "controlled by" or
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"governed by" the provisions of the Act. In Idaho Code §72-719(2), the Commission's
authority to modify a prior award is "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" the
maximum and minimum amounts authorized by the Act.
The common phrase "subject to" is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as follows:
Liable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed or
affected by; provided that; provided; answerable for. Homan v. Employers
Reinsurance Corp., 345 Mo, 650, 136 W.W. 2d 289, 302. Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Edition, West Publishing Co., 1979.
This interpretation of the phrase "subject to", which treats it as synonymous with
the phrases "controlled by" or "governed by", is consistent with the interpretation given
to the phrase "subject to" by other courts:
The phrase "subject to" is not synonymous with "according to" or
"consistent with"; it means conditioned upon, limited by, or subordinate
to. (Coffey v. Superior Court (1905) 147 Cal. 525, 535 [82 P. 75];
National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Frankel (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 830,
835 [250 Cal.Rptr. 236]; Shay v. Roth (1923) 64 Cal.App. 314, 318 [221
P. 967]; Colonial Savings & L. Assn. v. Redwood Empire Title Co. (1965)
236 Cal.App.2d 186, 191-192 [46 Cal.Rptr. 16]; State v. Willburn (1967)
49 Hawaii 651 [426 P.2d 626, 630].) Thus, if the Legislature had made the
entry of a judgment "subject to" a statutory provision, the effect of that
judgment would be controlled and limed by the statute. Swan Magnetics,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.App.45h, 1504, 1510 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 541]
( 1997) (italics supplied).
The ISIF's obligation to pay the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits based on
45% of the current ASWS was "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" or
"obedient to" or "subordinate to" the credit in paragraph 12 which clearly means that its
obligation to begin paying full statutory TPD benefits begins after 90 weeks - not after
250 weeks as it unreasonably argues now.
When the Claimant signed the Stipulation on 6.6.14, he reasonably interpreted the
phrase "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12" to mean that the ISIF's liability
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for paying full statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the currently applicable AWSW
would begin after 90 weeks because that is when Employer's 250 week obligation ended
after it had been "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" the same credit
described in paragraph 12 (See Ex. 5). The phrase "subject to the credit" should be
construed to mean the same thing when applied to both the Employer and the ISIP. Any
other interpretation is strained and extremely damaging to the Claimant.
The Claimant never would have signed the Stipulation if the ISIP's obligation to
pay him full statutory TPD benefits was not "subject to the credit" because that would
have left him without the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits for more than 3 years
from week 90 when Employer stopped paying its share of his TPD benefits until week
250 when ISIP would begin paying his full statutory TPD benefits.
The ISIF's position that the phrase "subject to the credit" means absolutely
nothing when it describes the ISIF's obligation to begin paying full statutory TPD
benefits is unconscionable because it would essentially bankrupt the Claimant by
depriving him of the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits and limiting him to a
small differential payment based on the difference between 55% of the AWSW in 2004
and the currently applicable 45% of the AWSW.
The bottom line is that the ISIP drafted the Stipulation and specifically stated that
its obligation to pay full statutory benefits was "subject to the credit discussed in
paragraph 12"; i.e., it had to begin paying full statutory TPD benefits at 90 weeks instead
of 250 weeks because its obligation was "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed
by" the credit just like the Employer's obligation to pay TPD benefits was "subject to" or
"controlled by" or "governed by" the credit.
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The Commission should give the phrase "subject to the credit discussed in
paragraph 12" its plain and ordinary meaning and enter a declaratory ruling which
requires the ISIP to begin paying its full statutory TPD benefit at 45% of the currently
applicable AWSW 90 weeks after the stipulated date ofMMI on 10.1.13.
(3)

ANY AMBIGUITY OVER THE DATE WHEN THE ISIP MUST BEGIN
PAYING THE CLAIMANT HIS FULL STATUTORY TOTAL AND
PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST
THE ISIP BECAUSE IT DRAFTED THE STIPULATION
The Claimant contends that the phrase "subject to the credit discussed in

paragraph 12" is not ambiguous because it is only susceptible of one reasonable
interpretation and means the same thing when applied to both the Employer and the ISIP.
However, If the Commission decides that the phrase "subject to the credit discussed in
paragraph 12" is ambiguous because it is susceptible of 2 or more different
interpretations, the Commission should construe that ambiguity against the ISIP and in
favor of the Claimant because the ISIP drafted the Stipulation:
The rules of construction of contracts and written documents in general
apply to the interpretation of court orders. Evans v. City of American
Falls, Idaho, 52 Idaho 7, 18, 11 P.2d 363 (1932); In re Callnan's Estate,
70 Cal.2d 150, 74 Cal.Rptr. 250, 449 P.2d 186 (1969); Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Byrne, 76 N.J.Super. 256, 184 A.2d 163 (1962). Interpretation
of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact. Cf Roberts v.
Hollandsworth, 582 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir.1978) (contract case); Pollard
Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, 115, 645 P.2d 344, 349 (1982)
(contract case). On the other hand, interpretation of an unambiguous
document presents a question of law. Cf Suchan v. Suchan, 106 Idaho
654, 660, 682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984) (contract case); Beal v. Mars Larsen
Ranch Corp., Inc., 99 Idaho 662,668, 586 P.2d 1378, 1384 (1978).
Determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a question of
law. Cf Pocatello Industrial Park, Co. v. Steel West, Inc., IOI Idaho 783,
789, 621 P.2d 399, 405 (1980) (contract case). Suchan v. Suchan, 113
Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1986) ...
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Moreover, the magistrate interpreted the order consistently with the
general rule that written documents, if ambiguous, should be construed
against the drafter. Cf Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho
506,519,201 P.2d 976 (1948) (contract case). Id 113 Idaho 108, 741 P.2d
1295.
The ISIP will ask the Commission to completely overlook the phrase "subject to
the credit discussed in paragraph 12" and treat that phrase as a nullity so that the ISIF can
avoid paying the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits until 250 weeks after the
stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13. The ISIF' s interpretation is not only inconsistent with
the plain language of the stipulation, it is unconscionable because it would deprive the
Claimant of his full TPD benefits for more than 3 years from week 90 to week 250.
The Claimant cannot live on the small differential payment that he would receive
from the ISIP based on the difference between Employer's obligation based on 55% of
the 2004 AWSW and the currently applicable 45% of the AWSW.

In 2015, that

differential payment is only $16.35 per week X 4 = $65.40 per month. After paying
attorney's fees, the Claimant would collect 75% of that amount or $49.05 per month. As
indicated in his affidavit, the Claimant cannot live on that amount and needs to collect the
full measure of his TPD benefits based on 45% of the currently applicable AWSW from
10.1.13 until the day he dies (See Ex. 5).
The Commission should construe the the Stipulation as a whole based on its
stated purpose and give effect to the true meaning of the parties when the Stipulation was
drafted; i.e., that the Claimant would receive the full measure of his statutory TPD
benefits as "if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable
for ... total and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law" (See ~20, p. 8 of
the Stipulation).

Claimant's Memo in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling

13

47

4.

THE CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §72-804
Even before the Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in Corgatelli and held

that there is no statutory basis under the Act to support granting the Employer an invalid
credit against its obligation to pay the full measure TPD benefits for PPI benefits
previously paid, the statutory provisions of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act did not
allow for a PPI credit against TPD benefits.

The Commission has never had the

jurisdiction or the authority to judicially construct a credit that did not exist and then
grant that invalid credit to an Employer. Therefore, it is obvious that the credit claimed
by Employer in this case is void under Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711.
The Claimant wrote to Employer and asked them to acknowledge that their PPI
credit was invalid and do the right thing by either reimbursing the Claimant for the
invalid credit that it took in violation of the Act or stipulate to amend the Stipulation to
eliminate the credit. Employer rejected both requests with a terse 2-line response thereby
placing the Claimant in the unreasonable position where he had no alternative but to file
this Petition For Declaratory Relief (See Ex. 2).
The Employer should be held liable for paying the Claimant's attorney's fees
based on 30% of the invalid credit or $39,649.50 or $11,894.85 because it has contested
the Claimant's claim for the full measure of his TPD benefits without reasonable grounds
by claiming a PPI credit that is obviously invalid under the Act.
The ISIP drafted the Stipulation which expressly made the ISIP' s obligation to
pay Claimant the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits "subject to" the credit
described in paragraph 12. The phrase "subject to the credit" is not ambiguous and
should mean the same thing when applied to the ISIP that it means when applied to the
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Employer; i.e., Employer's obligation to pay TPD benefits was shortened from 250
weeks to 90 weeks and the start date for the ISIF's obligation to pay full statutory
benefits based on 45% of the current A WSW was likewise shortened from 250 weeks to
90 weeks. No other interpretation would make any sense because it would require the
Claimant to go without the full measure of his TPD benefits for more than 3 years from
week 90 to week 250.
Even if the Commission construes the phrase "subject to" to be ambiguous and to
mean something other than "controlled by" or "governed by" the credit, according to
basic rules of contract construction, the ambiguous phrase must be interpreted against the
ISIF since it drafted the ambiguous language in the Stipulation.
After the Claimant's attempts to get Employer to do the right thing failed, the
Claimant wrote to the ISIF and asked it to confirm in writing that it would begin paying
Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the current A WSW after 90
weeks from the date of MMI on 10.1.13. Following Employer's lead, the ISIF also
rejected the Claimant's reasonable requests and refused to provide any explanation for its
position with a terse 4 line-letter (See Ex. 4) thereby forcing him to file this Petition For
Declaratory Ruling.
The position taken by the ISIF over the date when it must begin paying the
Claimant his full TPD benefits is unconscionable because it is not supported by any
reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the Stipulation and would deprive the
Claimant of the full statutory measure of his TPD benefits for more that 3 years. If the
Commission does not enter an award of attorney's fees against Employer based on 30%
of the invalid credit that it is claiming, then it should require the ISIF to pay the
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Claimant's fees because it has contested the Claimant's right to receive the full measure
of his statutory TPD benefits without reasonable grounds.

(C)

Conclusion

The stated purpose of the Stipulation drafted by the ISIF was to provide the
Claimant with "the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if this
matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for... total and
permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law" (See ,r20 on page 8 of the
Stipulation).
If the Industrial Commission does not declare the invalid credit granted to
Employer for PPI benefits previously paid void or declare that the ISIF must begin
paying its full statutory measure of the Claimant's TPD benefits based on 45% of the
currently applicable AWSW 90 weeks after the Claimant reached MMI on 10.1.13, the
Employer will be relieved of its obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure of his
TPD benefits and the Claimant will be forced to waive his right to receive the full
measure of his TPD benefits in direct violation of the Act and the express terms of the
Stipulation.
For all of the above reasons, the Claimant respectfully requests a Declaratory
Ruling from the Commission which declares the PPI credit claimed by Emproyer void or
requires the ISIP to begin paying the full measure of the Claimant's TPD benefits based
on 45% of the currently applicable AWSW 90 weeks after the 10.1.13 date ofMMI and
requires both Defendants to pay the Claimant's attorney's fees.

Claimant's Memo in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling

16

50

Respectfully submitted this 26th day of February 2015.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

iw_J)~

By:
RICK D. KALLAS
Attorney for Claimant

Certificate of Service

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February 2015, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of Claimant's Memorandum In Support of Petition For
Declaratory Ruling by the method indicated below upon the following persons:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

[ X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.888.2789

Jon M. Bauman
Elam&Burke
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.384.5844

M&W

Rick D. Kallas
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Exhibit 1
52

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C.

Joseph L. Ellsworth
Rick D. Kallas *
John C. DeFranco
•

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712

Phone:(208)336-1843
Fax: (208) 345-8945

Licensed in Idaho and Oregon
January 15, 2015

Via Facsimile
(208) 384-5844
Jon M. Bauman, Esq.
Elam & Burke, PA
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539
Re:

(1)
(2)

Request For Lump Sum Payment of Void 27% PPI Credit Claimed B~.mp~er / Surety
Alternative Request For Stipulation To Amend 6.24.14 Stipulation To Eliminate Void Credit

Davis v. llammack Management, Inc. & SIF
LC. No. 05-501080
Dear Mr. Bauman:
The stated purpose of the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants filed with the Industrial Commission on
6.24.14 was to provide the Claimant with "the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if this matter
proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for future medical care causally related to the industrial
injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for total and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law"
(See 120 on page 8 of the Stipulation). However, the language set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation
wrongfully gave Employer / Surety an undeserved credit toward its obligation to pay 250 weeks worth of TPD benefits
based on the 27% PPI rating that Employer / Surety had paid to Claimant before the parties stipulated that the Claimant
was totally and permanently disabled.
Just 62 days after the Stipulation was entered in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there is no statutory basis in
the Idaho workers' compensation act to give Employer/ Surety a credit for PPI benefits paid to the Claimant before he is
deemed totally and permanently disabled (See Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 157 (2014).
Because Employer/ Surety were not entitled to claim the 27% whole person PPI credit set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12
of the Stipulation under Corgatelli and because the PPI credit described in paragraphs 11 and 12 would require the
Claimant to waive his rights to receive full compensation for his total and permanent disability under the Idaho workers'
compensation act, the PPI credit is not valid and enforceable under Idaho law (See Idaho Code §72-318(2) and the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009)).
The 27% PPI credit claimed by Employer/ Surety is worth $39,649.50, calculated as follows: i.e., 27% X 500 weeks=
135 weeks X 2004 PPI rate of $293.70 = $39,64950). In order to avoid having to amend the Stipulation entered by the
Industrial Commission on 6.24.14, the Claimant respectfully requests that Employer / Surety pay him a lump sum
payment of $39,649.50 to fully compensate him for his total and permanent disability benefits. In the alternative, if
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Employer I Surety will not pay the Claimant his full total and permanent disability benefits in a lump sum as requested,
the Claimant requests that Employer I Surety prepare a stipulation to amend the 6.24.14 stipulation to eliminate the
unearned and void credit for the payment of the 27% whole person PPI benefits previously paid.
Please contact me at your convenience if you have any questions about the requests made in this letter. Thank you for
your cooperation.

Very truly yours,

1~~~
CC:

Client
ISIF attorney Kenneth L. Mallea via facsimile @ 208.888.2789

Davis, Gary/ I.15.15 Fax I Ltr. Jon Bauman
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ELAM&BDRKE
ATI'ORNEYSATLA.W

JON M. BAUMAN
251 East Front Street, Suite 300

Poot Office Box 1539
Bofse, Idaho 83701
Telephone 208 343-5454
Fax 208 384--5844

E-mail jmb®elamJrutt~,com

January 20. 2015
VIA FACSIMILE
# 345-8945

Riok D. Kallas
ELLSWORTII, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

1031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, Idaho 83712

Re:

ClaimNo.:
Claimant:
Date of Injury;
Employer:
E&B File No.:

200500871
Gary Davis
11/09/04
Hammack Management, Inc.
179-0174

Dear Mr. Kallas:

I am in receipt of your letter of January 15, 2015, I have conferred with the Surety about
the demand set forth in that letter. Your demand-is respectfully denied.
Very truly yours,

JMB:sd

cc:

Vicki Baer
Diane Evans
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ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C.

Joseph L. Ellsworth
Rick D. Kallas *
John C. Defranco
•

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712

Phone: (208) 336-1843
Fax: (208) 345-8945

Licensed in Idaho and Oregon

February 2, 2015

....

Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
78 SW 5th A venue
P. 0. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680-0857

Re:

Request For Confirmation That ISIF Will Pay Full Statutory TPD Benefits After 90 Weeks

Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc. and State Insurance Fund and State ofIdaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund·
J.C. No. 2005-501080

Dear Mr. Mallea:
When the parties entered into the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants and the Industrial
Commission entered its Order pursuant thereto on 6.24.14, all of the parties and the Commission were operating
on the premise that the purpose of the Stipulation was to provide the Claimant with "the full measure of benefits
Claimant would be entitled to receive if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable
for future medical care causally related to the industrial injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for
total and permanent disability' income benefits pursuant to law" (See if20 on page 8 of the Stipulation).
The total and permanent disability benefits that the Claimant is entitled to receive pursuant to the Stipulation were
defined in paragraph 11:
Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is entitled to be paid total and permanent disability
benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average weekly state wage pursuant to Idaho Code
Sections 72-408 and 72-409.
'
Employer and ISIP divided responsibility for the Claimant's total and permanent disability benefits based on the
formula announced by the Idaho Supreme Court in Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dep't, 107 Idaho.109, 686
P.2d 54 (1984). Paragraph 11 required Employer to pay 250 weeks worth of benefits beginning on the stipulated
date ofMMI of 10.1.13 "subject to the credit described in paragraph 12, below."
The phrase "subject to the credit in paragraph 12" was interpreted by all of the parties to mean that the ,r,'"-.
Employer's 250 weeks of liability would be shortened to 90 weeks of liability based on Employer claiming a .,
credit for 160 weeks of PPI / PPD benefits that Employer previously paid to Claimant prior to the date when the
parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled.
/
'
<Ji,~
0

•
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The language of paragraph 11 also made it clear that after the Employer satisfied its obligation to pay 250 weeks
of benefits which was shortened to 90 weeks after being "subject to the credit in paragraph 12", the ISIF would
begin paying Claimant his full statutory benefits based on 45% of the currently applicable AWSW:
At the expiration of said 250 week period, subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12,
below, the ISIF will pay Claimant his full statutory income benefits, said amount being 45% of
the then prevailing average state weekly wage, until Claimant's death (emphasis supplied).
The phrase "subject to the credit in paragraph 12" means the same thing when applied to the ISIF as it meant
when it was applied to Employer; i.e., that ISIF's obligation to begin paying the Claimant his full statutory total
and permanent disability benefits at 45% of the AWSW would begin at 90 weeks instead of 250 weeks because
the ISIF's obligation to pay full statutory benefits is "subject to the credit in paragraph 12" just like Employer's
obligation was subject to the credit in paragraph 12.
On 1.15.15, I wrote to the attorney for Employer, Jon Bauman, and advised him that 135 weeks of the credit
Employer claimed in paragraph 12 for PPI benefits previously paid was invalid based on the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Corg4telli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 157 (2014) (Note: I faxed you a
copy of my 1.15.15 letter to Mr. Bauman). Since Employer was not entitled to claim the invalid credit described
in paragraph 12 of the stipulation, paragraph 12 must be considered void because it deprives the Claimant of the
full measure of total and permanent disability benefits that he would be entitled to under the worker's
compensation act and violates the express purpose of the Stipulation.
To the extent that paragraph 12 requires the Claimant to waive his right to receive full total and permanent
disability benefits in violation of the worker's compensation act and the stated purpose of the stipulation, the
agreement is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(2) and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Wernecke v, St.
Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009). I asked Employer to either pay the
Claimant a lump sum for taking the invalid credit or stipulate to amend paragraph 12 of the 6.24.14 Stipulation to
eliminate the invalid credit. Employer responded on 1.20.15 and rejected both options (See copy of Mr. Bauman's
1.20.15 enclosed herewith).
Given Employer's position that it is entitled to claim an invalid credit, if the ISIF takes the position that it does
not have to begin paying the Claimant his full measure of statutory total and permanent disability benefits until·
250 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13, the Claimant will have no alternative but to file a Petition
For Declaratory Relief with the Industrial Commission because the unreasonable positions taken by Employer and
ISIF will leave the Claimant without any total and permanent disability benefits for approximately 3 years from
week 90 to week 250 (unless ISIF continues to pay a small differential payment from week 90 to week 250).
Please confirm that ISIF will begin paying the Claimant his full statutory total and permanent disability benefits
based on 45% of the currently applicable A WSW beginning 90 weeks after 10.1.13 based on the explicit language
of paragraph 11 which makes the ISIF's liability to pay full statutory benefits "subject to the credit in paragraph
12". If the ISIF will not begin paying the Claimant his full statutory total and permanent disability benefits 90
weeks after 10.1.13, please explain why the ISIF is refusing to pay the Claimant the full measure of his total and
permanent disability benefits in violation of the worker's compensation act and the express language of the
stipulation.
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Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Very truly yours,

'Rick- 1J. Xa{Cas
Attorney at Law
Enclosure

CC:

Gary Davis
Jon Bauman via facsimile@ 208.384.5844

Davis I ISIF 2.2.15 Request For Coniumation oflntent to Pay Full Statutoiy Benefits After 90 Weeks
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78 SW

5TH AVENUE, SUITE
POST OFFICE Box 857

KENNETH L. MALLEA
AITORNEY AT LAW

I

MERIDIAN ID 83680-0857

TELEPHONE

(208) 888-2790
FAX
(208) 888-2789
E-lviAJL

KLM@MALLEA.LA W.COM

February 5, 2015

Rick D. Kallas
I 031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, ID 83712
Re:

Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc., State Insurance Fund, ISIF
LC. Case No. 2005-501080

Dear Mr. Kallas:
I am in receipt of your letter dated February 2, 2015.
I have conferred with my client about your requested "confirmation" and, failing that,
your request for an explanation.
Your requests/demands are respectfully denied.

;?

Kenneth L. Mallea

KLM/dm
cc:
James F. Kile
Jon Bauman
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Rick D. Kallas
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
I 031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
(208) 345-8945
Facsimile:
E-mail:
rdk@greyhawklaw.com
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Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
LC. No. 2005 - 501080
Claimant,

vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,

CLAIMANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

and
IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND,
. Surety,

and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

Davis/ Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling
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Gary Davis, the Claimant, being first duly sworn on oath, states as follows:

1.

I am the Claimant in this case and make this affidavit based on my own personal
knowledge.

2.

Before I signed the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against the Defendants in my case on
June 6, 2014, I sat down in my attorney's office and read the Stipulation. At that time, it
was my understanding that the State Insurance Fund had agreed to pay its share of my
total and permanent disability benefits for 250 weeks after the date when the parties
stipulated that I reached maximum medical improvement on October I, 2013. However,
based on the language of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation, I understood that the
State Insurance Fund was taking a credit against its obligation to pay 250 weeks worth of
TPD benefits based on the 27% PPI award that it had paid to me and the 5% disability
above impairment award it had paid to me before the parties stipulated that I was totally
and permanently disabled by my industrial injmy.

3.

After the State Insurance Fund took the credits described in paragraph 12 oft.lie
Stipulation, I knew that it would stop paying me its share of my TPD benefits 90 weeks
after October 1, 2013. However, I was not concerned about losing those payments from
the State Insurance Fund because it was my understanding that the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund would begin paying my full statutory total and permanent disability
benefits based on 45% of the current Average Weekly State Wage when the State
Insurance Fund stopped making its payments. It did not matter to me who paid my
benefits as long as I continued to receive the full measure ofmy benefits based on 45% of
the current Average Weekly State Wage.

Davis I Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling
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4.

My understanding that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would begin paying my full
statutory total and permanent disability benefits based on 45% of the current Average
Weekly State Wage after 90 weeks was based on the plain language of paragraph 11
which said that the State Insurance Fund's obligation to pay me was "subject to the
credit" in paragraph 12 and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund's obligation was also
"subject to the credit" in paragraph 12. In my mind, that meant that when the State
Insurance Fund's obligation stopped after 90 weeks, the Industrial Special Indemnity
Fund's obligation to pay full benefits would start.

5.

Ifl would have known that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would take the position
that it did not have to start paying me my full statutory total and permanent disability
benefits until after 250 weeks, I never would have signed the Stipulation since it would
require me to waive my right to receive the full measure of my statutory total and
permanent disability benefits for more than 3 years from week 90 to week 250.

6.

I cannot live and pay my bills based on the small differential payment that I will receive
from the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund based on the difference between 45% of the
current Average Weekly State Wage and 55% of the Average Weekly State Wage for the
year that I was injured back in 2004.

7.

Based on 45% of the Average Weekly State Wage in 2015, that differential payment is
only $16.35 per week or $65.40 per month. After paying my attorney 25%, I will only
receive $49.05 per month.

8.

I cannot live and pay my bills on $49.05 per month. Therefore, I am asking the Industrial
Commission to not allow the State Insurance Fund to take the invalid credit for the 27%

Davis I Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling
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whole person PPI award that it previously paid to me. I understand that the State
Insurance Fund is legally entitled to take a credit for the 5% disability above impairment
benefits that it paid to me on a voluntary basis and I do not have any objection to that
credit.
9.

If the Industrial Commission is going to allow the State Insurance Fund to take the 27%
PPI credit, then I would ask the Industrial Commission to require the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund to begin paying full statutory benefits based on 45% of the current
Average Weekly State Wage when the State Insurance Fund payments stop after 90
weeks from October 1, 2013.

10.

If the State Insurance Fund is allowed to stop making payments after 90 weeks from
l 0.1.13 but the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund does not have to start paying my full
statutory benefits until 250 weeks after 10.-1.13, I will not be able to survive on the small
differential payment from the ISIF for more than 3 years.
Further your Affiant Sayeth Naught.

Dated this 25th day of February, 2015.

Davis I Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 25th day of February, 2015

County of Ada

)
: S.S.

State of Idaho

)

~V1W
N~ Public For Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires:

'fwh..WXY

lo) a01'1

Certificate of Service

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February 2015, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of Claimant's Affidavit In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling by the
method indicated below upon the following persons:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. I
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

[ X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.888.2789

Jon M. Bauman
Elam&Burke
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.384.5844
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Jon M. Bauman
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Bauman - ISB #2989
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Attorney for Defendants, Employer and Surety

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL_ COMMISSION
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
Claimant,
vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.
Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,

LC. No. 2005-501080 [sic]
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S OBJECTION
AND RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S.
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING
WHICH INTERPRETS AND CLARIFIES
THE STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF
AWARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND
DISCHARGE ENTERED BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON 6.26.14

Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S OBJECTION AND RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING - 1
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Defendants Employer and Surety (SIF) respond and object to Claimant's Petition for
Declaratory Ruling Which Interprets and Clarifies the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against
Defendants and Order of Approval and Discharge Entered by the Industrial Commission on
6.26.14 ("Petition") as follows.
Claimant's Petition is in effect an attempt to modify an order or award of the Industrial
Commission ("Commission"), namely, the Order of Approval and Discharge whereby the matter
identified in the caption of the Petition was dismissed with prejudice on June 26, 2014. That
matter having been dismissed with prejudice, it is final, concluded and forever discharged, by the
express terms of the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants ("Stipulation") that the
Commission approved and pursuant to which the Commission dismissed the Complaint in that
matter with prejudice.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-718, "a decision of the commission; in the absence of
fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing
the decision in the office of the commission" unless a party sought reconsideration under Idaho
Code Section 72-718 or "appeared pursuant to" Idaho Code Section 72-724. No party has
sought reconsideration of or filed a notice of intent to appeal from the Order of Approval and
Discharge entered by the Commission on June 26, 2014.
Idaho Code Section 72-719 provides a limited basis upon which a party may seek to
modify an award or agreement, but only for limited grounds, and within a limited time.
Specifically, the application for modification must be made "within five (5) years of the date of
the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease." Idaho
Code Section 72-719(1). Claimant's Petition has been filed too late to comply with that
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deadline. Moreover, Section 72-719 only permits modification of awards and agreements for
"(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disablement; or (b) Fraud."
Claimant's Petition fails to allege either of these circumstances. Therefore, the case identified
in the caption of the Petition is final and concluded. Claimant cannot reopen that matter.
Nevertheless, he has improperly filed a pleading as if the former matter were not concluded and
fully discharged. Claimant should have filed a new pleading with a new docket number (I.C.
No.) and served the respective parties. Claimant failed to do any of these things. He has
improperly used the caption of a claim that was dismissed with prejudice and then served former
counsel for the respective Defendants in that claim, rather than the parties themselves. Rule
4(B)(l), J.R.P., requires service on "all other parties." See also Rule 15(D), J.R.P.
Undersigned counsel was not authorized to act as the agent for Employer and Surety in the
former proceeding once that proceeding was dismissed with prejudice and the Order of Approval
and Discharge had been served on his respective clients. Thus, there has been a failure of
service of the Petition.
There is no occasion for the Commission to issue a ruling on the Petition because the
matter in which the Petition was filed was dismissed with prejudice as of June 26, 2014 and
Claimant failed, within the time allowed, to seek reconsideration of, appeal from, or assert
grounds for modifying the order dismissing that matter with prejudice. Thus, there is no "actual
controversy" for the Commission to resolve as required by Rule 15(F)(4)(b), J.R.P. The
controversy that existed among the parties has been fully and finally resolved by the
Commission's order approving the Stipulation and dismissing the matter with prejudice.
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Claimant's effort to invent a controversy is improper. Claimant seeks to give retroactive
application to a decision that the Idaho Supreme Court issued on August 25, 2014, almost two
months after the Commission dismissed the former proceedings with prejudice: Corgatelli v.
Steel West, Inc. Claimant cites no authority for the proposition that a dismissal with prejudice

resulting from approval of a Stipulation may be overturned whenever the Idaho Supreme Court,
or any other tribunal, may issue a decision that, had it been in effect prior to the final disposition
of a case, might arguably have affected some of the rights of one or more of the parties to the
former proceeding. The notion Claimant urges is unsupported by law and has the potential to
work vast mischief, as it would completely undermine the finality of any decision or award, even
where no party had ever sought reconsideration of, appealed from, or asserted appropriate
grounds for modifying the decision or award within the time permitted by law.
Claimant implicitly suggests that the Commission has not relinquished jurisdiction of this
matter. But as the Commission has previously held, "This argument stands the notion of finality
of an award on its head. A Commission decision is a final disposition of matters adjudicated.
Idaho Code Section 72-718." Further, "[w]hen the Commission deems it necessary to retain
jurisdiction after an award it expressly so states. This express action is necessary to hold open
an otherwise finally decided matter." Frank v. The Bunker Hill Company, I.C. 80-341382, 2003
WL 23064623 (Dec. 12, 2003). (This holding was affirmed in Frank v. The Bunker Hill
Company, 142 Idaho 126, 130-131, 124 P.3d 1002, 1006-1007 (2005), citing Fowler v. City of
Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 2-3, 773 P.2d 269, 270-271.) Here, there is no claim that the

Commission explicitly retained jurisdiction of this matter, and even if such a claim were made,
there is no evidence to support such a claim. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred merely by filing
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an improper pleading under an old and inoperative case number. Thus, the Commission should
dismiss or deny Claimant's Petition pursuant to Rule 15(F)(4)(a), J.R.P.
As the Commission held in Fodge v. Glen Fodge dba Fodge Logging, LC. No.
90-720094, 1998 WL 354229 (May 29 1998), "without finality all other aspects of the
procedural process would be rendered moot." The Commission added there that Idaho Code
Section 72-719 allows reopening of a case based upon fraud, "but only within five years after the
accident causing the injury or occupation[al] disease. Such a time restriction emphasizes the
obligation of the parties to diligently prosecute the case to hearing and of the Commission to
timely issue its decisions." The Commission went on to add "Applications for modification of
an award due to fraud must be made within five years of the accident causing the injury. The
motion to reopen was not filed until November of 1997, nearly two years past the statute of
limitations. To allow the Defendant's [sic] to reopen in this instance would open the flood gates
to relitigation of any case for an allegation of fraud. That is not the intent of Idaho Code,
Section 72-718. Defendant's motion is barred by the five-year statute oflimitations under Idaho
Code, Section 72-719."
If Claimant's view were allowed to prevail, no decision of the Commission dismissing a
case with prejudice would ever be final. A party could lie in wait and return to the Commission
at any time, even years after the matter was resolved, in hopes that some newly- developed
provision of law might - if retroactively applied - provide some new or additional relief beyond
that to which the party had already and long since agreed. Countless instances might be
imagined where a party who settled a claim learned, months or years later, of a change in the
law. Meanwhile, in reliance on the Commission's order approving an award and dismissing the
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Complaint with prejudice, the other parties doubtless, and reasonably, changed their position.
Witnesses may have died or moved away. Medical records may have been purged. There are
compelling reasons the statutes provide for finality of decisions and awards.
In this case, Claimant was represented by legal counsel. He voluntarily entered into the
Stipulation as appears from his acknowledged signature and that of his attorney. Moreover, the
Stipulation was not a one-sided, take-it-or-leave-it contract. Claimant's attorney requested the
inclusion of particular language in the Stipulation concerning attorney fees and his wishes were
accommodated in that regard. "Even at common law, a party who has signed an agreement is
bound by it, in the absence of fraud, duress or undue influence." See, e.g., Lawrence v.

Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,898,204 P.3d 532,538 (Ct. App. 2009) ("An agreement entered into
in good faith in order to settle adverse claims is binding upon the parties, and absent a showing
of fraud, duress or undue influence, is enforceable either at law or in equity."); St. Alphonsus

Regional Medical Center v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501,507,861 P.2d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 1992) ("The
agreement to compromise and settle is binding in the absence of fraud, duress or undue
influence.").
Claimant asserts none of these grounds. Indeed, having dismissed the Complaint with
prejudice, the Commission no longer has jurisdiction over the former proceeding. Thus,
pursuant to Rule 15(f)(4)(a)&(b), the Commission should decline to entertain the Petition or
enter a declaratory ruling. For the foregoing reasons, Claimant's Petition should be denied.
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Respectfully submitted this / (

day of March, 2015.

~aut~Wl)fthe Firm
omeys for Defendants, Employer and Surety

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_!_j_

day of March, 2015, I caused a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Rick D. Kallas

_k

& DEFRANCO, PLLC
1031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, Idaho 83712
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS

Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES

+

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
US.Mail

78 SW 5th A venue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

4835-1263-8754, V.

l
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Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
78 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680
Telephone: (208) 888-2790
Fax: (208) 888-2789
Idaho State Bar No. 2397
Attorney for Defendant State of Idaho
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO

********
GARY DAVIS,
LC. No. 2005-501080
Claimant,
vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,
and

LIMITED APPEARANCE TO
CHALLENGE SUBJECT MATTER
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PROCESS
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COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF"), by
and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby makes a limited appearance before the
Industrial Commission in response to Claimant's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Which
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Interprets and Clarifies the Stipulation for Entry of A ward against Defendants and Order of
Approval and Discharge entered by the Industrial Commission on June 26, 2014
("Petition"). JRP 15 addresses declaratory rulings before the Idaho Industrial
Commission. JRP 15E provides that: "Within fourteen days after service of a Petition, any
party served may file a written response thereto ... " This Response is made by the ISIP for
the limited purpose of seeking dismissal of the Petition on grounds that the Commission
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition, and that the service of the Petition
violates the Rules of Practice and Procedure which in turn results in a failure of personal
jurisdiction over the ISIP with respect to the Petition. Although the Commission's ~ules of
Practice and Procedure do not specifically address a limited appearance for the purpose of
contesting subject matter and personal jurisdiction, undersigned counsel believes that the
Commission may look to IRCP l 2(b) by way of analogy and by way of guidance in
reviewing the ISIF limited appearance Response.
More specifically, and again by way of analogy, the ISIP's limited appearance in
this proceeding would be analogous to motions filed under IRCP 12(b) (1) and (5).
Although the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to Industrial Commission proceedings
except in the context of pre-hearing discovery, the concepts of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim and over the purported Defendant are basic concepts of administrative
law and of Industrial Commission practice. Again, by analogy, we can look to the analysis
under IRCP 12(b) for guidance.
A.

The Industrial Commission Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the
Petition.

The Petition purports to be a continuation of Industrial Commission Case No 2005501080. That case was fully and finally concluded by the Industrial Commission's Order
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of Approval and Discharge entered June 26, 2014. The Order of Approval and Discharge
specifically stated that "the complaint is dismissed with prejudice."

No reconsideration

under Idaho Code §72-718 was sought by Claimant. No appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court pursuant to Idaho Code §72-724 was taken. The Order of Approval and Discharge
fully and finally concluded all matters with respect to Case No. 2005-501080.
The case having been fully and finally concluded, and the complaint against this
Defendant being dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the Industrial Commission's Order,
there is no continuing subject matter jurisdiction regarding Case No. 2005-501080. There
is no continuing jurisdiction of this Commission over that dismissed case. The Claimant,
by simply attaching a case number to a pleading, may not revive, reinstate or continue a
proceeding which had been dismissed with prejudice and by final order.
The concept of subject matter jurisdiction speaks to the power of the tribunal to
entertain the case and to adjudicate the claim or controversy. Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz,
September 19, 2014 Idaho Supreme Court Op. No. 101. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot
be conferred by a self-serving and legally wrong pleading.
There is no doubt that the Commission has general jurisdiction to entertain a
Petition for Declaratory Ruling as set forth in JRP 15A. However, the Commission does
not have jurisdiction to entertain a Petition for Declaratory Ruling under a case which has
been conclusively and finally dismissed with prejudice. A Petition for Declaratory Ruling
is necessarily a new case, resting on its own merits (or lack thereof) and is not based upon
the pleadings, record, testimony, discovery, claim and defenses asserted by the parties in
the prior and dismissed case 2005-501080.
In proceeding in this limited appearance, the ISIP is not intending to frustrate the
liberal provisions of Idaho Code §72-708 or to unduly constrict the application of JRP 15.
LIMITED APPEARANCE TO CHALLENGE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND SERVICE OF
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But the instant Petition is necessarily a new proceeding which is governed by JRP 15 and
which is separate and apart from the normal process of a complaint, service thereof on the
ISIF, and the filing of an answer and other affirmative defenses by the ISIF. There is
simply no way for this Claimant to leg into the entirety of the record in Case No. 2005501080 or for this Claimant to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the Commission in a
fully and finally adjudicated proceeding. In the event of appeal of any final ruling on any
appropriate and proper petition to come before the Commission by this Claimant, the
record on appeal certainly should not include the entirety of the Clerk's record in Case No.
2005-501080. This is an entirely new, separate, and distinct claim and the ISIF does not
consent to the validity of the Petition as a continuation of Case No. 2005-501080 and
submits that the Industrial Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the Petition.
B.

The Petition Has Not Been Properly Served Upon the ISIF.

As noted, the ISIF is making a limited and special appearance to contest jurisdiction
of the Industrial Commission over the Petition. Valid service of process is a condition
precedent to the tribunal's jurisdiction over the "person" of the Defendant. JRP 4 addresses
service of a Workers Compensation Complaint. JRP 4(B)(l) mandates that the party filing
a Complaint shall serve "all other parties." Subsection (B)(2) mandates that the pleading
shall be served upon the last known address of the respective party. The ISIF has no agent
as may be present regarding an Employer or Surety. Undersigned counsel is not the agent
of the ISIF for purposes of service of process. JRP 15 likewise addresses service of a
Petition for Declaratory Ruling. JRP 15(D) requires the Petitioner to serve a copy of the
Petition "on all other persons to the actual controversy at the time the Petition is filed with
the Commission." JRP 15(B) provides that "person" shall be construed to include
"governmental agency or department," which the ISIF undoubtedly is.
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As noted in the Petition, the pleading was purportedly "served" by mailing a copy
to undersigned counsel. Yet undersigned counsel is not the agent for the ISIF and is not
authorized to accept service of process of any complaint or any Petition for Declaratory
Ruling.
Service of process is the due process procedure which vests a tribunal with
jurisdiction over a person or a party. McG!oon v. Gwinn, 140 Idaho 727, 100 P.3d 621
(2004). Service of process is not a technical or trivial concept in law or in proceedings
before the Idaho Industrial Commission. The Commission's own rules address service of
process and mandate that a petition or pleading must be served directly upon a party. Valid
service of process in accordance with the Commission rules is a condition precedent to the
Commission's jurisdiction over a party, and in this case, over the ISIP.
C.

Conclusion.

As in District Court cases, the failure of the ISIF to raise at this preliminary
juncture, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, could be said to
constitute a waiver. The ISIP therefore respectfully comes forward at this early part of the
proceeding to lodge its objections to the continuation of this proceeding. The disposition of
the pending Petition under JRP 15(F)(4) should be dismissal for the failure of subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the ISIP. The pending Petition should be
dismissed.
DATED this//

~
day of March, 2015.
MALLEA LAW OFFICES

J~/fe~

Kenneth L. Mallea
Attorney for Defendant ISIP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the// day of March, 2015, a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon:
Rick D. Kallas
1031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, ID 83712
Attorney for Claimant
Jon M. Bauman
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Attorney for Employer/Surety

X by U.S. mail
_ _ by facsimile
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Rick D. Kallas
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
E-mail:
rdk@greyhawklaw.com
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Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
Claimant,
J.C. No. 2005 - 501080
vs.

HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,
and

CLAIMANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
CLAIMANT'S PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

Claimant's Consolidated Reply Memorandum In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling

82

(A)

INTRODUCTION

The Claimant is filing a consolidated Reply Memorandum In Support of his Petition For
Declaratory Ruling that addresses the 3 .11.15 written response from the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund (ISIF) and the 3 .11.15 written response from Employer / Idaho State Insurance
Fund (Employer).

(B)
1.

REBUTTAL OF THE ISIF'S ARGUMENTS

THE WDICAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DO NOT AUTHORIZE THE
FILING OF A LIMITED APPEARANCE
Idaho Code §72-508 authorizes the Industrial Commission to promulgate reasonable rules
and regulations to accomplish the purposes of the Act. Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-508, the
Industrial Commission promulgated the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure (JRP).
According to Idaho Code §72-508, those rules "shall be binding in the administration of this
law". JRP 15 - Declaratory Rulings - sets forth a very specific procedure that must be followed
when any interested person asks the Industrial Commission "for rulings on the construction,
validity, or applicability of any workers' compensation statute, rule, or order" JRP 15(A).
After the Petitioner served his Petition For Declaratory Ruling on the Employer and the
ISIF, "any party served may file a written response thereto, stating with specificity the facts and
the law on which the responding party relies". JRP 15(E) (underline supplied). The language of
JRP 15(E) is clear and unambiguous. JRP 15(E) only allows the party served with a Petition For
Declaratory Ruling to file one written response. The ISIF made the voluntary tactical decision to
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limit its one written response to the filing of a "limited appearance" which is not even
authorized by the JRP.
The ISIF has admitted in its written response that "the Commission's Rules of Practice
and Procedure do not specifically address a limited appearance for the purpose of contesting
subject matter and personal jurisdiction" (Seep. 2, LL 9-13). The ISIF has also admitted that
"the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to Industrial Commission proceedings except in the
context of pre-hearing discovery" (See p. 2, LL 16-17).
After making those binding admissions, the ISIF then asked the Industrial Commission to
judicially construct a new limited appearance rule and insert it into the Judicial Rules of Practice
and Procedure "by way of analogy" to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Without following
the proper rule making procedure for creating a new rule and adding it to the Judicial Rules of
Practice and Procedure, the Industrial Commission does not have the authority to judicially
construct a new limited appearance rule by analogy to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
With the exception of the limited discovery tools authorized by JRP 7(C), the Idaho
Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply to proceedings before the Industrial Commission:
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure govern m the district courts and the
magistrate's division of the district courts. I.R.C.P. l(a). The Industrial
Commission is not a division of the district court. See I.C. § 72-501(1) (statutory
creation of the Industrial Commission as an executive department of the state
government). Furthermore, the Commission has the authority to "promulgate and
adopt reasonable rules and regulations involving judicial matters" and to the
extent the regulations are consistent with law, they are binding. I.C. § 72-508.
Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 311, 179 P.3d 265, 274 (2008).
The Commission is not bound by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but it does
have its own rules of procedure. Vawter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 155 Idaho
903,318 P.3d 893,901 (2014).
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Since the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure do not authorize a limited appearance
and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to Industrial Commission proceedings, the
Industrial Commission should not consider the subject matter and personal jurisdiction
arguments advanced by the ISIF in its unauthorized limited appearance. However, in the event
that the Industrial Commission elects to consider the arguments made by the ISIP in its limited
appearance, the Commission should reject each of the ISIF's arguments because they lack merit.
2.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO DECIDE
THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE CLAIMANT'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RULING
The ISIP argues that the Industrial Commission does not have subject matter jurisdiction
to clarify the parties' rights, duties and obligations under the Idaho Code §72-711 Compensation
Agreement 1 because the Industrial Commission entered an Order of Approval and Discharge
pursuant thereto on 6.26.14. The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Williams v. Blue Cross of
Idaho, 151 Idaho 51, 260 P.3d 1186 (2011) soundly refutes the ISIF's lack of subject matter

jurisdiction argument.
In Williams, the Claimant entered into a final lump sum settlement agreement with the
State Insurance Fund which was finalized and approved by the Industrial Commission. After the
settlement agreement was finalized and approved by the Commission, the Claimant filed a
Petition For Declaratory Ruling asking the Commission for a Declaratory Ruling that clarified
the legal rights of all interested persons to the settlement proceeds (including the rights of a nonparty subrogee).

1
In this case, the Compensation Agreement at issue was entitled by the Defendants as a Stipulation For Entry of Award Against
Defendants and Order of Approval and Discharge.

Claimant's Consolidated Reply Memorandum In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling

4

85

Before the Commission clarified the legal rights of the interested persons, it asked the
parties to submit briefs on the question of whether the Industrial Commission had subject matter
jurisdiction to decide the issues raised by the Petition. Both parties argued that the Industrial
Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to clarify the parties' legal rights pursuant to the
finalized and approved lump sum agreement. The Commission disagreed with the parties and
ruled that it had proper subject matter jurisdiction to clarify the parties' legal rights.
Although neither party challenged the Commission's exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte and held that the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to determine all interested

persons' legal rights in the lump sum agreement that had already been finalized and approved by
the Commission just like the Compensation Agreement in this case:
We conclude that the Commission had jurisdiction to consider whether Blue
Cross is a subrogee, rather than a creditor, under I.C. § 72-802, and that the
Commission also had jurisdiction to determine the extent of Blue Cross'
entitlement to the settlement proceeds. According to I.C. § 72-707, " [a]II
questions arising under [the workers' compensation laws of this state], if not
settled by agreement or stipulation of the interested parties with the approval of
the commission, except as otherwise herein provided, shall be determined by the
commission." I.C. § 72-707. Generally, the Commission's jurisdiction is limited to
adjudicating " certain complaints filed by a workers' compensation claimant
against an employer or an employer's surety." Owsley v. Idaho Indust. Comm'n,
141 Idaho 129, 134, 106 P.3d 455, 460 (2005) (emphasis omitted). However, the
Commission may properly exercise jurisdiction in cases, like this one, where the
Commission is asked to clarify a claimant's rights under a lump sum settlement
agreement. Pursuant to LC. § 72-404, the Commission has the responsibility to
approve lump sum settlement agreements and in doing so, must determine that the
settlement is in the best interest of the parties. It necessarily follows that the
Commission has jurisdiction to clarify a claimant's rights under a lump sum
settlement agreement that is presented for Commission approval. Id. 151 Idaho
54-55, 260 P.3d 1189-1190 .....
Although the case at hand concerns the subrogation of a third-party insurer rather
than the SIF, both instances require clarification of a worker's rights arising under
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workers' compensation law. According to the statutory mandates in J.C. §§ 72707, -803, and -404 mentioned above, the Commission is the proper tribunal to
clarify such rights, particularly in the case of a lump sum settlement where a
claim for medical services is at issue. Williams, by filing this declaratory
judgment action, was essentially asking the Commission to clarify his rights to the
proceeds of the lump sum settlement agreement that he entered into with the SIF,
particularly in light of Blue Cross' claim for a portion of the settlement proceeds
that it argued were for amounts it paid for medical services provided to Williams.
In order to determine Williams' rights under the settlement agreement, the
Commission necessarily had to determine whether Blue Cross was a subrogee. In
determining that Blue Cross was a subrogee, the Commission implicitly
determined that Williams was not entitled to all of the lump sum proceeds
because Blue Cross had paid Williams' disputed medical bills and, therefore, Blue
Cross, as a subrogee, assumed Williams' legal right to attempt to collect payment
for such expenses. Consequently, the Commission had jurisdiction to consider
whether Blue Cross is a subrogee because Blue Cross' status as subrogee directly
affects Williams' entitlement under the lump sum settlement agreement.
Further, although the Commission found that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the
extent of Blue Cross's subrogation entitlement, such a determination was also
within its authority and was, in fact, necessary to determine whether the lump sum
settlement was in the parties' best interest. As mentioned above, the Commission
must approve all lump sum settlement agreements, and in doing so, it is the
Commission's responsibility to ensure that the settlement is in the best interest of
the parties. J.C. § 72-404. This is a responsibility that the Commission must
scrupulously honor. See Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist.# 401, 147 Idaho
277, 286, 207 P.3d 1008, 1017 (2009). If an injured worker's insurance company
has provided compensation for medical expenses for which the worker is now
seeking to obtain workers' compensation benefits, it is in the best interest of the
parties to ensure that the insurance company's subrogation claim is resolved
contemporaneously with the proposed settlement. This would help ensure that the
parties will not be subjected to further litigation after the settlement agreement is
finalized. Coupled with the jurisdiction grants in J.C. §§ 72-707 and -803, section
72-404 requires the Commission to do so.
It is also worth noting that before approving the lump sum settlement agreement
in this case, the Commission could and should have requested that the parties
stipulate as to how the lump sum settlement proceeds were to be allocated,
including what portion was to be allocated to Blue Cross for payment of the
disputed medical bills. Therefore, pursuant to its authority, the Commission could
have attempted to get the parties to stipulate as to how the settlement proceeds
were to be allocated and, failing such agreement, determined the entitlement of
each. Williams, supra, 151 Idaho 155-156, 260 P.3d 1190-1191 (emphasis
supplied).
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The rationale for the holding in the Williams applies to this case.

Just like the

Commission was asked to review the final lump sum agreement in Williams pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-404, the Commission in this case was asked to review and approve the Compensation
Agreement pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711.

Williams makes it abundantly clear that the

Industrial Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to clarify the parties' legal rights under the
Compensation Agreement and the workers' compensation Act as requested by the Claimant in
his Petition For Declaratory Ruling. The Commission should reject the ISIF's lack of subject
matter jurisdiction argument because it lacks merit.
3.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
The ISIP argues that the Industrial Commission lacks personal jurisdiction over the ISIP
because the Claimant served his Petition For Declaratory Ruling on the Defense attorney for ISIP
who first appeared as the ISIP' s attorney of record on 9.11.11 when he signed the ISIP' s Answer
to the Complaint that Employer filed against the ISIP. From the date of his initial appearance on
9 .11.11 to the date when the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order of Approval and
Discharge which approved the parties' stipulated Compensation Agreement, the same Defense
attorney has appeared as the attorney of record for the ISIP throughout these proceedings.
If the ISIF's attorney wished to withdraw as the attorney of record for the ISIP in these
proceedings, he had to comply with the mandatory withdrawal procedures set forth in JRP 14.
B. Leave to Withdraw. Except as provided above, or by stipulation between an
attorney and his or her client, no attorney may withdraw as an attorney of record
without first obtaining approval by the Commission. A request to withdraw shall
be made by filing a motion, supported by affidavit, with the Commission and
served on all parties to the action, including the client. The Commission may
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grant leave to withdraw as counsel of record on a showing of a factual basis to
establish good cause and on such conditions as will prevent any delay in
determination and disposition of the pending action. JRP 14(B).
Since Defense counsel for ISIF never filed a Motion For Leave to Withdraw and never
obtained an Order from the Industrial Commission authorizing him to withdraw, he is still the
attorney of record for the ISIP and was the appropriate agent to receive service of the Claimant's
Petition For Declaratory Ruling on behalf of the ISIF. Since the Claimant properly served the
ISIF' s attorney of record, the Industrial Commission has proper personal jurisdiction over the
ISIF in these proceedings.
The ISIF argues that the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling should be treated as
an entirely separate and distinct cause of action. However, that argument lacks merit. The
Claimant has but one cause of action against Employer and the ISIP arising out of his 11.9.04
industrial accident. Just because the Claimant's one cause of action may have resulted in
multiple hearings, multiple orders or multiple declaratory rulings, that does not change the
singular nature of the one cause of action which exists between the Claimant, the Employer and
the ISIF.
The Commission's decision was in error because collateral estoppel does not
apply to this case, which involved multiple hearings but one cause of action.
Collateral estoppel " precludes relitigation of the same issue in a separate cause of
action." Id A cause of action is a " group of operative facts giving rise to one or
more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a
remedy in court from another person.... " Black's Law Dictionary 251 (9th ed.
2009).
Here, all of the orders deal with the same operative facts related to Vawter's
employment with UPS, so the orders do not deal with separate factual situations.
Therefore, all the hearings and orders address only one cause of action. See Sanije
Berisha, Claimant, IC 2002-003038, 2012 WL 2118142 (Idaho Ind.Com. May 30,
2012) (" Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the
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litigation, albeit including several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the
same case."). Vawter, supra, 318 P3d. 903-904.
Since the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling is part of the same cause of action
against the Defendants which arose from the Claimant's 11.9.04 industrial accident, it was
proper for the Claimant to serve the ISIP through its Defense attorney of record who has never
obtained an Order from the Commission authorizing him to withdraw as the ISIF's attorney of
record. The ISIF was properly served by mailing the Petition to its attorney of record and the
Industrial Commission has proper personal jurisdiction over the ISIP.
4.

THE ISIP DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO FILE A SECOND WRITTEN RESPONSE
JRP 15(E) limited the ISIF to filing one written response in opposition to the Claimant's

2.26.15 Petition For Declaratory Ruling. By making the tactical decision to limit the scope of its
one written response to a limited appearance which attacked the Commission's exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, the ISIP has exhausted its rights under JRP
15(E) and cannot file a second written response challenging the merits of the Claimant's Petition:
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage."
Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981). " It is a
voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value
or to forego some right or advantage which he might at his option have demanded
and insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 368, 304 P.2d 646, 649
(1956). Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp, 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167
(2009).
The ISIF made the voluntary tactical decision to forego its right to address the substantive
merits of the Claimant's Petition and chose instead to place all of its eggs in one basket and focus
exclusively on the subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction issues. By making that
voluntary election, the ISIF has exhausted its legal rights under JRP 15(E) and cannot file a
second written response to challenge the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling.

Claimant's Consolidated Reply Memorandum In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling

9

90

(C)
1.

REBUTTAL OF EMPLOYER'S ARGUMENTS

THE CLAIMANT SEEKS A DECLARATORY RULING THAT THE PPI CREDIT
GRANTED TO EMPLOYER IN THE COMMISSION'S 6.26.14 ORDER IS VOID
Employer has mischaracterized the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling as an
untimely Motion To Modify a final Order pursuant to Idaho Code §72-719. The Claimant is not
seeking an Order which modifies the Commission's 6.26.14 Order pursuant to Idaho Code §72719. The Claimant is asking the Commission for a Declaratory Ruling that the PPI credit it gave
to Employer in its 6.26.14 Order is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-711
and Idaho Code §72-318 because there was no statutory basis which authorized the Commission
to give Employer a PPI credit against its obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure of his
statutory total and permanent disability (TPD ) benefits.
Employer fails to appreciate the difference between a void order which has no legal effect
from the moment it is created and a valid order which can later be modified pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-719. The 6.26.14 Order is void ab initio since the Commission did not have the
statutory authority to judicially construct a PPI credit against the Claimant's TPD benefits.
Therefore, the invalid credit that was granted to Employer exceeds the jurisdiction of the
Commission and must be declared void.

2.

THE COMMISSION HAS PROPER SUBJECT MATTER AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER EMPLOYER
Employer makes the same lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction
arguments that were made by the ISIF and rebutted in sections (B) (2) and (3) above. The
Petition For Declaratory Ruling is not a separate cause of action which requires a new caption
and a new case number. This is a single cause of action that arises out of the same industrial
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accident on 11.9.04 and involves the same operative facts and the same parties.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams, the Commission obviously has subject
matter jurisdiction to resolve all disputed issues that arise under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act pursuant to Idaho Code §72-707. The Commission also has subject matter
jurisdiction to clarify the Claimant's rights under a Compensation Agreement that was approved
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711.
The Defense attorney for Employer has been the attorney of record in this case for
approximately 9 years since he filed Employer's Answer to the Complaint on 5.22.06. If the
Defense attorney wished to withdraw as attorney of record for Employer, then he had a duty to
comply with the mandatory leave to withdraw requirements of JRP 14(B) and file a Motion For
Leave to Withdraw with the Industrial Commission and obtain an Order authorizing him to
withdraw. Since Defense counsel failed to file a Motion To Withdraw, he remained Employer's
attorney of record.

Therefore, it was perfectly appropriate for Claimant to serve Employer

through its attorney of record with his 2.26.15 Petition For Declaratory Ruling. Both Employer
and the ISIP have been properly served in this Declaratory Ruling proceeding and the Industrial
Commission has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over both Defendants.
3.

THE CLAIMANT HAS AN ACTUAL CONTROVERSY WITH BOTH EMPLOYER AND
THEISIF
Employer argues that there is no actual controversy between Claimant and Employer
because any controversy that previously existed was fully and finally resolved by the 6.26.14
Order approving the Compensation Agreement. Again, Employer fails to appreciate the
distinction between a void Order which is void ab initio and a valid Order which becomes final
and cannot be modified except under the limited circumstances described in Idaho Code §72-
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719. A void Order has no legal meaning or effect and cannot be considered a valid final Order
that resolves all of the controversies between the parties.
The Claimant carefully framed the actual controversy which exists with Employer over
the void PPI credit and the actual controversy which exists with the ISIP over the date when its
obligation to pay full statutory TPD benefits begins in his Petition For Declaratory Ruling and
his Memorandum in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling.
Employer is taking an invalid PPI credit against its obligation to pay full TPD benefits in
direct violation of Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711. That
actual controversy will deprive the Claimant of 55% of the 2004 AWSW from week 90 to week
225 and will cost the Claimant $39,649.50 in TPD benefits.
The ISIP is taking the position that it does not have to begin paying the Claimant his full
statutory TPD benefits at 45% of the currently applicable AWSW until week 250 even though
the Stipulation clearly states that the ISIF's obligation is "subject to" the invalid PPI credit being
claimed by Employer. That actual controversy will deprive Claimant of his full statutory TPD
benefits for more than 3 years from week 90 to week 250.
Based on the record before the Commission, there can be no dispute that an actual
controversy exists between the Claimant and the Defendants which could cost the Claimant more
than 3 years of TPD benefits.
5.

THE COMMISISON DID NOT HAVE A VALID STATUTORY BASIS TO GRANT
EMPLOYER AN INVALID PPI CREDIT EVEN BEFORE CORGATELLI WAS DECIDED
Employer argues that the Claimant seeks to give retroactive application to the holding in
Corgatelli v. Steel West, 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) which was decided on 8.25.14,
approximately 60 days after the Commission approved the invalid PPI credit in this case on
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6.26.14.
Both the Idaho State Insurance Fund and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund were
named Defendants in the Corgatelli case. That means that when the Defendants in this case
signed the Stipulation in June of 2014, they had already filed their written briefs and made their
oral arguments to the Idaho Supreme Court in Corgatelli. Both Defendants were intimately
familiar with the legal arguments being made in Corgatelli and knew that the Idaho Supreme
Court could issue an opinion any moment that would prevent tl;te State Insurance Fund from
taking the invalid PPI credit against the Claimant's TPD benefits.
Although both Defendants had insider knowledge of the arguments being made in
Corgatelli, Employer and the ISIP chose to remain silent in this case. Neither Defendant notified

Claimant that the $39,649.50 PPI credit being taken by Employer might be declared invalid by
the Idaho Supreme Court at any moment. Instead, they signed the Stipulation in June of 2014
hoping that the 20-day time frame for filing a Motion For Reconsideration and the 42-day time
frame for filing an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court would expire and they could hide behind
an "alleged" fmal Order and argue that an invalid credit became valid because it was merged into
a fmal Order.
Even if Employer is correct and the holding in Corgatelli cannot be applied retroactively
to the 6.26.14 Order, that does not address the fundamental statutory arguments made by the
Claimant pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711; i.e.,
that the PPI credit granted to Employer must be declared void under Idaho Code §72-318 and
Idaho Code §72-711 because there were no statutory provisions in the worker's compensation
Act which authorized the Commission to grant Employer a PPI credit against its obligation to
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pay the full measure ofTPD benefits.
Since the Commission acted beyond the jurisdiction granted to it by statute when it
granted Employer the invalid PPI credit, the PPI credit provisions of the Compensation
Agreement and Order of Approval and Discharge must be declared void and set aside pursuant to
Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711. Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-318 and
Idaho Code §72-711 were all in effect when the Industrial Commission entered its Order of
Approval and Discharge on 6.26.14.
Employer argues that an invalid agreement can be made valid by simply calling it a final
Order. Employer's logic is flawed. Under Idaho Code §72-711, the PPI credit provisions of the
6.26.14 Compensation Agreement and Order never became a valid final Order because the
Commission only had jurisdiction to approve the final agreement of the parties "when the terms
conform to the provisions of this law" and the PPI credit granted to Employer obviously did not
conform to the provisions ofidaho Code §72-408.
The PPI credit provisions of the Compensation Agreement in this case clearly did not
conform to the provisions of the law because they relieved the Employer of its obligation to pay
full TPD benefits in direct violation ofidaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Cod §72-318(1) and they
required the Claimant to waive his rights to receive full TPD compensation under the Act in
direct violation ofidaho Code§72-408 and Idaho Code §72-318(2).
The Supreme Court has made it very clear that any agreement which requires the
Employee to waive his right to receive full compensation under the Act must be declared void:
Section 72-318(2) sets out the State's policy that agreements purporting to waive
an employee's rights to compensation under the Act are void. Wernecke v. St.
Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 286, 207 P.3d 1008, 1117
(2009).
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Conclusion

JRP 15(E) gave the ISIP the right to file one written response in opposition to the

Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling. The ISIP did not address the substantive merits of
any of the Claimant's statutory arguments or contract construction arguments in its written
response. Likewise, the ISIP did not object to the Claimants' request for an award of attorney's
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. Instead, the ISIP chose to limit its response to a limited
appearance challenge to subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The Judicial Rules of Practice
and Procedure do not authorize a limited appearance.
Since the ISIP did not oppose any of the Claimant's requests for declaratory relief or the
Claimant's request for attorney's fees, the Claimant requests a Declaratory Ruling which
requires the ISIF to begin paying Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the
current AWSW 90 weeks after the MMI date of 10.1.13.; i.e., on or about 5.23.15.

The

Claimant also requests an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 because the
ISIP has contested the Claimant's right to receive his full statutory TPD benefits without
reasonable grounds.
The Employer did not respond to the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code
§72-711 arguments in its written response.

The Employer's silence must mean that the

Employer realizes that that the Industrial Commission has no choice but to declare the PPI credit
provisions of the Compensation Agreement and Order of Approval and Discharge void because
they relieve the Employer of its obligation to pay full statutory TPD benefits in violation of
Idaho Code§ 72-408 and Idaho Code §72-318(1) and require the Claimant to waive his right to
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receive the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-408
and Idaho Code §72-318(2).
Since the terms of the invalid PPI credit granted to Employer did not conform to the
provisions of the Act, the Commission did not have authority to approve the PPI credit and it
must be declared void and set aside pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711 and Idaho Code §72-318.
Like the ISIP, the Employer did not even address the Claimant's request for attorney's
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. Implicit in the Employer's silence is the recognition that it
has contested the Claimant's right to receive the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits under
Idaho Code §72-408 without reasonable grounds. The Commission should declare that portion of
the Compensation Agreement which awards an invalid PPI credit to Employer void and award
attorneys' fees to the Claimant because Employer has contested his right to receive the full
measure of his TPD benefits without reasonable grounds.
Time is of the essence in this matter because the Employer will stop paying the Claimant
55% of the 2004 AWSW 90 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13; i.e., on or about
5 .23 .15. The Claimant respectfully requests that the Commission issue the requested Declaratory
Rulings in this case as soon as possible.

Respectfully submitted this 17th day of March 2015.
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

By:£~~
RICKD. KALLAS
Attorney for Claimant
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Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of March 2015, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of Claimant's Rely Memorandum In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling
by the method indicated below upon the following persons:

Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

[ X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.888.2789

Jon M. Bauman
Elam &Burke
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.384.5844

[ J
[ J

-Q~~

Rick D. Kalla~

Claimant's Consolidated Reply Memorandum In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling

17

98

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
IC 15-000107
(2005-501080)

Claimant,
Petitioner herein,

v.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT INC.,
Employer,

ORDER ON PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

FILED

Surety,

-6

and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Respondents herein.
On February 26, 2015, Petitioner filed his Petition for declaratory ruling with supporting
memorandum.

Petitioner requests a ruling on the impact of Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc.,

157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) on the parties' lump sum settlement agreement (LSSA),
approved by order of the Commission dated June 26, 2014. Petitioner argues that Corgatelli,

supra, renders the PPI credit in the LSSA invalid, and without Commission intervention,
the present LSSA improperly denies Petitioner the full measure of his statutory total permanent
disability benefits, unfairly relieves Employer/Surety (Employer) and the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund (ISIF) of their respective obligations to pay Petitioner total permanent disability
benefits, unfairly requires Petitioner to waive his full statutory total permanent disability
benefits, and adversely affects the timing of ISIF' s total permanent disability payments.
Petitioner also wishes the Commission to evaluate the LSSA for ambiguity, and to order the
payment of attorney's fees by Employer and ISIF because they have contested Petitioner's
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request for the "full measure" of his TPD benefits.
On March 11, 2015, Employer filed an objection to Petitioner's request.

Employer

argues that Petitioner's proposed issues are not proper for a declaratory ruling, because
Petitioner's petition is an attempt to retroactively apply Corgatelli, supra, to the June 26, 2014
LSSA, which was dismissed with prejudice.

Employer argues that the reconsideration and

appeal time has passed, thus the LSSA is final and no actual controversy exists. Employer also
challenges Petitioner's service of the petition for declaratory ruling.
On March 12, 2015, ISIP filed a limited appearance to challenge the subject matter
jurisdiction and service of process.
On March 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a reply brief.

Petitioner objects to the ISIF's

arglli?ents, and contends that the Commission has jurisdiction to consider his petition for
declaratory ruling.
Petitioner Properly Served Respondents

ISIF and Employer argue that Petitioner improperly served them because their respective
legal counsel no longer represented them after the negotiated LSSA. However, neither counsel
for the ISIF nor Employer complied with Commission rules treating the withdrawal as counsel of
record under J.R.P. 14. The Commission finds that Petitioner properly served his request for
declaratory ruling.
The Impact of Corgatelli on the Previously Approved LSSA

Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law
(JRP) 15(c) (May 8, 2013) describes by whom, and for what, a petition for declaratory ruling
may be filed:
J.R.P. lS(c). Contents of Petition.

Whenever any person has an actual controversy over the construction, validity or
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applicability of a statute, rule, or order, that person may file a written petition with
the Commission, subject to the following requirements:
1.

The petitioner must expressly seek a declaratory ruling and must identify
the statute, rule, or order on which a ruling is requested and state the issue
or issues to be decided;

2.

The petitioner must allege that an actual controversy exists over the
construction, validity or applicability of the statute, rule, or order and must
state with specificity the nature of the controversy;

3.

The petitioner must have an interest which is directly affected by the
statute, rule, or order in which a ruling is requested and must plainly state
that interest in the petition; and

4.

The petition shall be accompanied by a memorandum setting forth all
relevant facts and law in support thereof.

The Commission may decline to make a ruling where it lacks jurisdiction over the issue
presented or where there is other good cause why a ruling should not be made. J.R.P.15(f).
Here, it is clear that Petitioner qualifies as a "person" as defined in the rule. Petitioner
alleges the existence of an "actual controversy" over the validity of an Order of the Commission,
i.e., the LSSA approved by order of the Commission dated June 26, 2014. Petitioner contends
that in view of Corgatelli, supra, the "credit" given in the LSSA for the payment of a prior
impairment rating is illegal. Employer and the ISIP assert that the LSSA is legal, binding,
and not subject to further review by the Commission.

Assuming that the Commission has

continuing jurisdiction over the LSSA, an "actual controversy" between Petitioner and the other
parties to the LSSA appears to exist since Petitioner may net a larger recovery depending on
how the controversy is resolved.
The LSSA at issue in this matter was approved by the Commission on June 26, 2014
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-404, which provides:
Whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interest of all parties,
the liability of the employer for compensation may, on application to the
commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or in part by the
ORDER ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 3

101

payment of one or more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the
comm1ss10n.
Idaho Code § 72-404.
LSSAs are agreements of both compromise and commutation. The LSSA approved by the
Commission contains both of these elements. The LSSA reflects that Petitioner suffered the
subject work accident on November 9, 2004. This accident caused injury to Petitioner's lumbar
spine. Petitioner suffered from a number of pre-existing conditions involving his lumbar and
cervical spine. In fact, prior to November 9, 2004, Petitioner had undergone four lumbar spine
surgeries.

Following the November 9, 2004 accident, Petitioner underwent five additional

lumbar spine surgeries and two cervical spine surgeries. The parties agree that the subject
accident caused further injury to Petitioner's lumbar spine and that Petitioner is totally and
permanently disabled, with a date of medical stability of October 1, 2013.
The parties also stipulated and agreed that all elements of ISIP liability are satisfied,
and that responsibility for Petitioner's total and permanent disability should be apportioned
between Employer and the ISIP. The manner in which that disability should be apportioned
between Employer and the ISIP is the principle dispute resolved by the LSSA.
The LSSA reflects that there was disagreement between the parties over the extent
and degree of Petitioner's accident-produced impairment, two physicians proposing that this
impairment equaled 100%, while two other physicians proposed that Petitioner's accidentproduced impairment equaled 22%. For the purposes of the LSSA, the parties stipulated that
Petitioner's pre-existing permanent physical impairment equaled 32% of the whole person,
while his accident-produced impairment equaled 27% of the whole person. The parties agreed
that Petitioner's total and permanent disability would be shared by the Employer and the ISIF
using these agreed upon PPI ratings to apportion Petitioner's remaining disability "according to
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law," i.e., per Carey v. Clearwater Cnty Road Dept. 107 Idaho

109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984).

Therefore, with these assumptions in place, the parties agreed that Employer would accept
responsibility for the payment of 250 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits commencing
October 1, 2013. During this 250 week period, the ISIF agreed to pay Petitioner additional
benefits to bring Petitioner's weekly benefit up to the amount he is entitled to as a totally
and permanently disabled employee. Thereafter, the ISIF would be solely responsible for the
payment of total and permanent disability benefits until Petitioner's death.
Paragraph 12 of the LSSA reflects that prior to the execution of that document, Employer
paid the entire 27% PPI rating ($39,649.50) which the parties agreed was owed by Employer. In
addition, Employer had paid Petitioner an amount equal to 5% of the whole person as an advance
against permanent disability. These benefits totaled 32% or 160 weeks of PPD, $46,992.00 at
the appropriate rate. The LSSA reflects that Employer is entitled to apply these payments as a
credit against its obligation to pay 250 weeks of benefits from October 1, 2013 forward.
It is Petitioner's central contention that per Corgatelli, the credit allowed by the LSSA

for the previously paid 27% PPI rating ($39,649.50) is illegal, and that Employer must pay the
full 250 weeks contemplated by the calculation set forth in Carey v. Clearwater Cnty Road

Dep't, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 (1984).

It is worth reviewing Carey, supra, in connection with Petitioner's assertions about the
application of Corgatelli, supra, to this matter.
In Carey, the claimant was found to have permanent physical impairment of 10% relating
to a pre-existing condition and 40% relating to the work accident, for a total of 50%. Carey was
found to be totally and permanently disabled under the odd lot doctrine, and the question before
the Court was how to apportion the 50% disability from nonmedical factors (100% minus 50%
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PPI = 50% disability from nonmedical factors) between the employer and the ISIP. Noting that
the Commission had applied different rules to apportion liability between employer and ISIP in
several cases then before the Court, the Court announced a rule of general application to address
how disability from nonmedical factors should be apportioned where the ISIP shares
responsibility with employer for claimant's total and permanent disability. The Court stated:
We believe that the appropriate solution to the problem of apportioning the
nonmedical disability factors, in an odd-lot case where the fund is involved, is to
prorate the nonmedical portion of disability between the employer and the fund,
in proportion to their respective percentages of responsibility for the physical
impairment. Thus, in the instant case, Mr. Carey's preexisting impairment was
10% of the whole man, and his physical impairment from the accident is an
additional 40%, resulting in a 50% impairment. Claimant is 100% disabled, by
virtue of the odd-lot doctrine, so an additional 50% nonmedical factors, over and
above the 50% physical impairment, need to be allocated between the
employer/surety and the fund. The fund is therefore responsible for 10/50, or 4/5
(80%) [sic], of the nonmedical portion of disability, and the employer is liable for
40/50, or 4/5 (80%), of the nonmedical factors.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in addition to the responsibility that employer and ISIP each bear for PPI, they also bear
responsibility for disability from nonmedical factors in the same proportion that they share
responsibility for PPL Therefore, in Carey, employer was responsible for 40/50 of the claimant's
disability from nonmedical factors, or 40% over and above the PPI for which it was responsible
(40/50 x 50% = 40%). Employer's total responsibility under Carey was 80% (40% disability for
nonmedical factors + 40% PPI). This rating was payable at 55% of the average state weekly
wage for the year of injury. The claimant was entitled to recover from the ISIP the difference
between the permanent partial disability compensation paid by the employer and the total and
permanent disability benefits to which he was found to be entitled as an odd lot worker.
The facts of Carey bear a certain similarity to those before the Commission in the instant
matter. Here, the parties stipulated that Petitioner's pre-existing PPI was 32%, while his accident
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produced impairment was 27%. These impairments total 59% of the whole person, leaving
41 % disability over and above impairment to apportion between the Employer and the ISIP in
the same proportion that each entity bears responsibility for Petitioner's total PPI of 59%.
Employer's responsibility for disability over and above Petitioner's PPI is calculated as follows:
27/59 x 41 = 18.76%.

Therefore, the total responsibility of Employer for the payment of

disability, inclusive of impairment, is 45.76% (27% PPI + 18.76% disability from nonmedical
factors). 45.76% disability equates to 228.80 weeks of disability paid at 55% of the average state
weekly wage for the year of injury. 1 The responsibility of Employer to pay these benefits
commences, per the LSSA, on October 1, 2013. Petitioner is entitled to recover from the ISIP
the difference between the permanent partial disability compensation paid by Employer and the
total and permanent disability benefits to which Petitioner is entitled by virtue of his total and
permanent disability.
Of course, prior to the LSSA, Employer discharged its obligation to pay the 27% PPI
rating, possibly concluding that it had no defense to the payment of the same once Petitioner had
been pronounced stable and ratable. Petitioner contends that the fact that this payment was made
is in no wise relevant to the obligation of Employer to make this payment again as part of its
responsibility under Carey, notwithstanding, as developed above, that a careful reading of Carey
actually seems to endorse the notion that Employer should not have to pay the same impairment
twice. Petitioner relies on the recent case of Corgatelli in support of his position.
In Corgatelli, the Commission found claimant to be totally and permanent disabled, and
determined that liability should be shared by employer and the ISIP. Corgatelli was found to

1

Although the Carey calculation actually yields Employer responsibility for the payment of 228.80 weeks of
benefits, the parties agreed, for whatever reason, that the Carey calculation yields Employer responsibility for the
payment of250 weeks of benefits. (See paragraph 10 of the LSS.)
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have impairment totaling 15% of the whole person, with 5% attributable to a pre-existing
condition and I 0% attributable to the subject accident. This left 85% disability from nonmedical
factors to be apportioned between the ISIP and the employer. Applying the Carey formula, the
Commission found that employer's liability for disability from nonmedical factors was 56.7%
(10/15 x 85). To this, the Commission added employer's responsibility for PPI, and found that
the total responsibility of employer was 66.7% (56.7 + 10). 66.7% disability equates to 333.5
weeks of benefits commencing as of the date of Corgatelli's medical stability.
Employer filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking a ruling from the Commission that
in discharging its obligation to pay disability benefits in the amount of 66. 7% of the whole
person, it was allowed to take a credit for the I 0% PPI rating already paid to Corgatelli. The
Commission reasoned that to deny employer's request would be to essentially require employer
to pay the PPI award twice.

Therefore, employer's motion was granted.

Employer was

obligated to pay the 66. 7% disability award but received a credit in the amount of the PPI award
already paid.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court first addressed the Commission's decision to
credit employer's finite responsibility to pay a 66.7% disability award with the PPI payments it
had previously made. The Court stated that PPI and PPD are different creatures entirely, and that
there is no statutory authority that authorizes the Commission to apply the payment of PPI
benefits as a credit against an employer's obligation to pay total and permanent disability
benefits.
As applied to the facts of the instant matter, application of this rule means that against
their obligation to pay disability of 45.76% (which consists of PPI of 27% and disability from
nonmedical factors of 18. 76%) Employer will not be allowed a credit for the 27% PPI previously
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paid. While we agree that the holding of Corgatelli appears to endorse double payment of PPI,
and therefore a double recovery to Petitioner, we are constrained by what seems to be the
unambiguous rule of that case. Therefore, were this case before us following a hearing which
adduced facts like those recited in the approved LSSA, we would likely be required to conclude
that Employer is not entitled to a credit for the previously-paid PPI, and must pay the full
45.76% disability rating, notwithstanding that that rating is a composite of the previously paid
PPI and disability from nonmedical factors owed under Carey.
Of course, this case did not go to hearing, but was resolved by the Commission's
approval of a LSSA proposed and executed by the parties. In cases involving the ISIP, the
Commission is cognizant of its heightened responsibility to be satisfied that such proposed
agreements meet the standards imposed by Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401,
147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009).

As respects settlements with the ISIP, the Court

unambiguously concluded that the Industrial Commission does not even have jurisdiction to
consider such a LSSA without first being satisfied that all elements of ISIP liability are met.
Only then does the Commission have jurisdiction to consider whether the proposed LSSA is in
the best interests of the parties under Idaho Code § 72-404. Essentially, the Commission must
ascertain why it makes sense for a claimant to accept a lump sum payment from the ISIF when,
absent settlement, a claimant would receive total and permanent disability payments for life.
Here, the parties do not dispute that Petitioner is totally and permanently disabled, and
the LSSA so reflects. Moreover, the LSSA reflects that the statutory elements of ISIP liability
are satisfied. In his petition, Petitioner does not challenge that part of the LSSA which finds
Petitioner to be totally and permanently disabled, and the elements of ISIP liability satisfied.
Rather, the focus is on the credit taken, and whether this is in conflict with Corgatelli.
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It is axiomatic that an order approving a LSSA is a "decision" of the Commission

pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718. (Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 154 Idaho 633, 637, 301
P.3d 639, 643 (2013), citing Davidson v. HH Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 760, 718 P.2d 1196,
1198 (1986)). In addition to approving the LSSA, the June 26, 2014 Order of the Commission
dismissed Petitioner's complaint with prejudice. Under Idaho Code § 72-718, Petitioner had 20
days after June 26, 2014 within which to file with the Commission his motion for reconsideration
of the Commission's approval of the LSSA. This, he failed to do, and no appeal of the order
approving the LSSA was taken to the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, this "decision" of the
Commission is final.
Idaho Code § 72-719 specifies that within five years following the date of injury,
an injured worker may petition the Commission for a modification of an award to address
a change of condition, fraud, or to correct a "manifest injustice". Significantly, the provisions
ofldaho Code § 72-719 do not apply to a LSSA approved by the Commission pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 72-404. See Idaho Code 72-719(4). Therefore, neither does Idaho Code§ 72-719
afford Petitioner a path forward on attacking the approved LSSA.
Idaho Code§ 72-318, discussed at some length in Wernecke, supra, provides:
(1) No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the premiums paid by his
employer for workmen's compensation, or to contribute to the cost or other
security maintained for or carried for the purpose of securing the payment of
workmen's compensation, or to contribute to a benefit fund or department
maintained by the employer, or any contract, rule, regulation or device whatever
designed to relieve the employer in whole or in part from any liability created by
this law, shall be valid. Any employer who makes a deduction for such purpose
from the remuneration of any employee entitled to the benefits of this act shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2) No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this
act shall be valid.
The Wernecke Court recognized that generally speaking, the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-318
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prohibit the agreement by an employee to give up his right to pursue workers' compensation
benefits for claims that have not yet arisen. Much of the discussion of this statute in Wernecke
centered around a narrow exception to this general rule which allows the ISIP to enter into
LSSAs under the terms of which the injured worker waives his right to future compensation.
However, citing to Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005), the Wernecke
Court made it clear that LSSAs which resolve claims for a past injury are not void under
Idaho Code § 72-318.
Therefore, Idaho Code § 72-318 does not authorize Petitioner's attack on the LSSA.
First, vis-a-vis the LSSA with the ISIP, this LSSA is one of the narrow variety of LSSAs
which can legally resolve claims for future injuries. Second, vis-a-vis the Employer, this LSSA
is one which resolves a past injury, a type of LSSA altogether appropriate under Idaho Code
§ 72-318.

Accordingly, the doctrines of quasi-estoppel and res judicata, which were found

inapplicable in Wernecke because the prior LSSA was void under Idaho Code § 72-318, do have
application here. We conclude that neither Wernecke nor the provisions ofldaho Code § 72-318
provide any basis to attack the approved LSSA.
Of course, it was but a scant few days following the Commission's approval of the
subject LSSA that the Court issued its opinion in Corgatelli, supra, and it must be acknowledged
that had the parties been pre-aware of the holding in that case, the LSSA would look different
than the one approved by the Commission. It may have provided for additional payments, it may
have provided for the same payments but couched in different language, or the parties might
never have reached any agreement.
Suffice it to say, however, that we can think of no mechanism by which the approved
LSSA may be attacked at this remove.

The Industrial Commission lacks subject matter
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jurisdiction to entertain revision of the LSSA approved by final decision of the Commission.
Even if such a request could be entertained, we conclude that there is yet no way to retroactively
apply the rule of Corgatelli to past LSSAs and past decisions of the Commission.

The

Commission would do little else but revisit many thousands of long-resolved claims were that
the case.
ISIF's Obligation to Pay Benefits

Petitioner's second principle contention is that if Employer is entitled to a "credit" for
past PPI paid, the LSSA approved by the Industrial Commission is ambiguous in defining the
date on which the ISIF becomes solely responsible for paying Petitioner's entitlement to
statutory benefits for total and permanent disability. Petitioner asks the Commission to resolve
the ambiguity by construing the LSSA to require that the ISIF's exclusive responsibility to pay
statutory benefits shall commence at the expiration of 90 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013,
as opposed to the expiration of 250 weeks subsequent to that date.
We find that the LSSA is not ambiguous, and that the responsibility of the ISIF to assume
exclusive responsibility for the payment of statutory benefits for total and permanent disability
does not begin until after the expiration of250 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013.
As reflected in paragraph 11 of the LSSA, the parties agreed on a scheme by which
responsibility for the payment of statutory total and permanent disability benefits would be
apportioned between the employer and the ISIF. Per the LSSA, the Employer and the ISIF share
responsibility for the payment of statutory benefits for 250 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013,
with the ISIP assuming sole responsibility for the payment of benefits at the end of that
250 week period.

However, paragraph 11 also specifies that Employer's obligation to pay

benefits during the 250 week period subsequent to October 1, 2013 is subject to the "credit"
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for the previous payment of a 27% PPI rating and a 5% advance on disability, equating to
160 weeks of benefits.

The argument is that the application of this credit results in the

acceleration of the date on which the ISIF becomes solely responsible for the payment of
benefits.

Application of the credit means that the ISIF assumes sole responsibility for the

payment of statutory benefits at the expiration of 90 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013
(250 weeks minus 160 weeks).
We do not believe the LSSA

contemplates the outcome suggested by Petitioner.

Paragraph 11 of the LSSA clearly contemplates that despite whatever credit may be taken by
the Employer, ISIF's responsibility to pay 100% of Petitioner's statutory benefits does not
commence until the expiration of250 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013.
Petitioner argues that to do other than as he suggests will leave him with a benefit gap
between October 1, 2013, and the expiration of the 250 week period referenced in the LSSA.
Therefore, the argument goes, unless ISIF's responsibility to pay 100% of Petitioner's statutory
benefit is pushed back to 90 weeks following October 1, 2013, the application of the credit will
leave Petitioner without full payment of his statutory entitlement for a period of approximately
160 weeks. However, this argument fails to recognize that Petitioner has been paid for this 160
week period, and presumably received that payment during the 160 week period, i.e., subsequent
to the October 1, 2013 date of medical stability. We find no basis to support the assertion that
Petitioner will somehow be shortchanged where ISIF's sole responsibility for the payment of
Petitioner's total and permanent disability benefits does not begin until the expiration of the 250
week period following October 1, 2013.
Attorney Fees

Petitioner requests Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney's fees against Employer and ISIF
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for their refusal to declare the PPI credit void, and ISIF's refusal to pay TPD benefits 90 weeks
after the October 1, 2013 date of MMI. Petitioner has failed to persuade the Commission that
attorney's fees are appropriate.
ORDER

For these reasons, we decline to accept Petitioner's invitation to revisit the provisions of
the LSSA approved by the Industrial Commission on June 26, 2014.
DATED this
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COMES NOW the Petitioner/ Claimant, Gary Davis, and pursuant to Idaho Code §72718 and J.R.P. 3(G), hereby moves the Industrial Commission for an Order which reconsiders
the Industrial Commission's October 6, 2015 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling on the
grounds and for the reasons that:
1.

The industrial commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction and entered an invalid
order when it granted employer / surety an unauthorized credit for the payment of PPI
benefits in direct violation ofldaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409;

2.

The Industrial Commission did not fulfill its obligation to set aside its invalid June
26, 2014 Order pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(1), Idaho Code §72-318(2) and
Idaho Code §72-711; and,

3.

The phrase "subject to the credit" is ambiguous because it leads to completely
different outcomes when inconsistently applied to each defendant and deprives the
claimant of the full measure of his total and permanent disability benefits.
This Motion For Reconsideration is based on the provisions of the Idaho Workers'

Compensation Act, the JRP and the points and authorities set forth in the Petitioner's Brief in
Support of Motion For Reconsideration.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of October 2015.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS
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(1)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS LIMITED filRISDICTION AND
ENTERED AN INVALID ORDER WHEN IT GRANTED EMPLOYER/ SURETY AN
UNAUTHORIZED CREDIT FOR THE PAYMENT OF PPI BENEFITS IN DIRECT
VIOLATION OF IDAHO CODE §72-408 AND IDAHO CODE §72-409
The Industrial Commission only has limited jurisdiction as defined by the provisions of

the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act:
The Commission has no jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has
specifically granted to it. The Commission therefore exercises limited jurisdiction,
with nothing being presumed in favor of its jurisdiction. See Idaho Power Co. v.
Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 744, 750, 639 P.2d 442, 448 (1981)
(jurisdiction of Public Utilities Commission limited). Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho
686, 690, 864 P. 132, 136 (1993).
When the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order approvmg the parties'
Compensation Agreement, there was absolutely no provision in the entire worker's
compensation act which gave the Industrial Commission jurisdiction to give Employer / Surety a
credit for PPI benefits previously paid toward its obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure
of his total and permanent disability benefits required by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code
§72-409:
Examining worker's compensation law as a whole, Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 141
Idaho 524, 528, 112 P.3d 812, 816 (2005), this Court finds that there is no
statutory basis for the Commission to award Steel West a credit for permanent
physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli. ...
Thus, the current version of Idaho Code section 72-408, which provides for the
employee such as Corgatelli to receive total and permanent disability benefits,
includes no deduction or credit for previously paid permanent impairment benefits
in its award of disability benefits ....
No other statute in Idaho's worker's compensation law permits the employer to
receive credit for permanent physical impairment benefits paid before the award
of total and permanent disability benefits. As a purely statutory scheme, the Court
cannot judicially construct a credit for employers into worker's compensation law.
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 1155 (2014).
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The Defendants in the Corgatelli case were the Idaho State Insurance Fund and the
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. The Idaho Supreme Court published its Corgatelli decision
on 8.25.14- just 60 days after the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order approving the
Compensation Agreement in this case. What is interesting about this time line is that when the
State Insurance Fund and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund signed the Stipulation For Entry
of Award Against the Defendants (Compensation Agreement) in this case, they knew that
Claimant in Corgatelli had already appealed the Industrial Commission's grant of a PPI credit to
the Employer in Corgatelli to the Idaho Supreme Court and that an adverse decision from the
Supreme Court could be entered at any moment.
Even though the State Insurance Fund and the ISIF both knew that the PPI credit issue
was on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court in Corgatelli while the stipulation in this case was
being drafted by the Defendants, neither Defendant felt the need to disclose that fact to the
Claimant in this case before he executed the stipulation. Of course, if the Claimant had known
that both Defendants were parties to a case on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court which
addressed the PPI credit issue, the Claimant never would have agreed to the credit language set
forth in paragraph 12 of the stipulation in this case.
Even if the Idaho Supreme Court had never published the Corgatelli decision, the
Industrial Commission cannot escape the fact that on the date it approved the Compensation
Agreement in this case on 6.26.14, there was absolutely no provision in the entire Idaho
Workers' Compensation Act which gave the Industrial Commission the jurisdiction to grant
Employer I Surety a credit for PPI benefits previously paid and then subtract that credit from the
Employer's obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure of his total and permanent disability
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benefits required by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409.
Based on nothing but a pure statutory analysis and without even considering the Court's
holding in Corgatelli, the Compensation Agreement approved by the Commission on 6.26.14
must be treated as an invalid agreement under Idaho Code §72-318(1) because it "relieve[s] the
employer in whole or in part" of the Employer's liability to pay the Claimant the full measure of
his total and permanent disability benefits as required by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code
§72-409. The Commission cannot judicially construct or approve a credit for Employer that the
statute does not provide. The Compensation Agreement is also invalid under Idaho Code §72318(2) because it requires the Claimant to waive his rights to receive the full measure of his total
and permanent disability benefits under Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409.
When the Commission ruled on the Petitioner's Petition For Declaratory Ruling, the
Commission dismissed Petitioner's Idaho Code §72-318 arguments by giving an extremely
narrow and overly technical interpretation to the Supreme Court's holding in Wernecke v. St.

Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009). According to the
Industrial Commission's interpretation of Wernecke, Idaho Code §72-318 can only be applied in
those limited situations where the Claimant has entered into an agreement that purports to waive
claims for future injuries. The Wernecke Court expressly rejected this type of overly narrow and
hyper-technical interpretation of the Act:
When interpreting the Act, we must liberally construe its provisions in favor of
the employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was promulgated.
Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 115 P.3d 721, 724 (2005); Davaz v.
Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994). The Act
is designed to provide sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families
and dependents. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296; LC. § 72-201. The
primary objective of an award of permanent disability benefits is to compensate
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the claimant for his or her loss of earning capacity. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870
P.2d at 1296. The purposes served by the Act leave no room for narrow technical
constructions. Reese, 141 Idaho at 633, 115 P.3d at 724. Wernecke v. St. Maries
Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,282,207 P.3d 1008, 1113 (2009).
The Supreme Court has not given Wernecke the overly narrow interpretation applied by
the Industrial Commission and limited the application ofldaho Code §72-318 only to agreements
which waive future claims. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has recently held that Idaho
Code §72-318 can be used to declare any agreement void if that agreement violates any
provision of the workers' compensation Act:

This Court has set aside a lump sum agreement on grounds of illegality but in that
case the agreement was violative of the provisions of a workers' compensation
statute. See Wernecke, 147 Idaho at 286, 207 P.3d at 1017 (the Commission "
erred by approving an agreement" that purported to waive an employee's right to
compensation for future injuries because the Commission failed to make findings
required by LC. § 72-332). However, Morris does not contend that the LSSA
violates the provisions of any statute and has not shown that it is afflicted by any
other illegality. Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 154 Idaho 633, 301 P. 3d 639,
643 (2013) (italics supplied).

If the Claimant in Morris had alleged that the LSSA had violated any provisions of the
Idaho workers' compensation Act or was illegal for some other reason, the Court would have
properly applied Idaho Code §72-318 and set aside the illegal agreement. The Claimant in this
case has specifically alleged that certain provisions of the Compensation Agreement violate the
Act because they give Employer / Surety an illegal credit for the payment of PPI benefits that
reduces their obligation to pay Claimant the full measure of his total and permanent disability
benefits as required by Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-409 and the formula announced by
the Supreme Court in Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d
54 (1984).
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The plain language of Idaho Code §72-318 states that any agreement which relieves an
Employer of its obligation to pay the full measure of benefits due or forces the Claimant to waive
his right to receive the full measure of benefits is invalid. The Industrial Commission should
grant the Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration based on the plain language of Idaho Code
§72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409 which do not give the Commission the jurisdiction to grant the
Employer any credit for PPI benefits previously paid.
The Industrial Commission stated in its 10.6.15 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider revising the illegal provisions in the
Compensation Agreement that were approved by the Commission in its 6.26.14 Order (See pp.
11-12 of 10.6.15 Order). However, the Industrial Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court
always have subject matter jurisdiction to set aside an illegal or invalid agreement:
The parties did not argue the illegality of the agreement until this appeal. The
illegality of a contract, however, can be raised at any stage in litigation. The Court
has the duty to raise the issue of iIIegality sua sponte. Morrison v. Young, 136
Idaho 316, 318, 32 P.3d 1116, 1118 (2001); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,
566, 944 P.2d 695, 701 (1997). Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law
for the court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case.
Morrison, 136 Idaho at 318, 32 P.3d at lll8; Quiring, 130 Idaho at 566,944 P.2d
at 701 (citing Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,283,240 P.2d 833,840 (1952)).
An iIIegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act
or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. Quiring, 130 Idaho at
566, 944 P.2d at 701 (citations omitted). The general rule is that a contract
prohibited by law is illegal and unenforceable. Id.; Williams v. Cont'! Life & Acc.
Co., 100 Idaho 71, 73,593 P.2d 708, 710 (1979); Whitney v. Cont'! Life and Acc.
Co., 89 Idaho 96, 105,403 P.2d 573,579 (1965). A contract "which is made for
the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by statute ... is void."
Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 6ll, 990 P.2d 1219, 1222
(Ct.App.1999) (quoting Porter v. Canyon County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45
Idaho 522,525,263 P. 632,633 (1928)). This rule applies on the ground of public
policy to every contract which is founded on a transaction prohibited by statute.
Id. (citing Porter, 45 Idaho at 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928) (citations omitted)).
Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765,768 (2002).
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The Industrial Commission should grant the Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration
because the Industrial Commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction when it gave Employer /
Surety an illegal credit for the payment of PPI benefits when Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho
Code §72-409 did not authorize such a credit on the date when the Industrial Commission
approved the Compensation Agreement on 6.26.14.
(2)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEEDED THE LIMITED filRISDICTION
GRANTED TO IT UNDER IDAHO CODE §72-711 WHEN IT APPROVED A
STIPULATON I AGREEMENT THAT VIOLATED IDAHO CODE §72-408 AND
IDAHO CODE §72-409
When the parties to a worker's compensation claim enter into an agreement to resolve the

Defendants' liability for the payment of total and permanent disability benefits, there are 2 legal
mechanisms that may be used: (1) A compensation agreement which defines the Defendants'
obligations to make periodic payments to the Claimant pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and
Idaho Code §72-409 which is subject to the approval of the Commission pursuant to Idaho Code
§72-711; or (2) a lump sum settlement agreement which commutes the periodic payments that
would otherwise be due under I.C. §72-408 and LC. §72-409 into a lump sum and which is
approved by the Industrial Commission pursuant to Idaho Code §72-404:
Once a determination is made regarding the degree of a claimant's permanent
disability, compensation for that disability may be awarded either through
periodic payments, LC. §§ 72-408, -409, or through a single lump sum payment,
I.C. § 72-404. The particular method of compensation is left largely to the
discretion of the parties, subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission, LC.
§§ 72-404, 72-711. Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 291, 293, 732
P.2d 260,262 (1986).
In his Petition For Declaratory Ruling, the Claimant alleged that the stipulation /
agreement for periodic payments at issue in this case was a Compensation Agreement that must
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be set aside under Idaho Code §72-711 because its provisions did not conform to the provisions
ofldaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409:
72-711. COMPENSATION AGREEMENTS. If the employer and the afflicted
employee reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this law, a
memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with the commission, and, if
approved by it, thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be an award by
the commission and be enforceable under the provisions of section 72-735, unless
modified as provided in section 72-719. An agreement shall be approved by the
commission only when the terms conform to the provisions of this law (italics
supplied).
Rather than address the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-711 Compensation Agreement
arguments in its 10.6.15 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling, the Industrial Commission
mischaracterized the periodic payment agreement entered into by the parties as a Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement (LSSA) and ignored the requirement of Idaho Code §72-711 that all
agreements involving periodic payments must "conform to the provisions of this law".
The LSSA at issue in this matter was approved by the Commission on June 26,
2014 pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-404, which provides: ...
LSSAs arc agreements of both compromise and commutation. The LSSA
approved by The Commission contains both of these elements. (See pp. 3-4 of
10.6.15 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling).
A careful reading of the "Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants" that was
approved by the Commission in its 6.26.14 Order confirms that the agreement did not require
Employer I Surety or the ISIF to pay the Claimant a lump sum. On the contrary, the agreement
required the Defendants to make periodic monthly payments of total and permanent disability
benefits to the Claimant at the statutory rate of 45% of the AWSW beginning on 10.1.13
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409 and the Carey formula. There is
absolutely no textual basis in the body of the stipulation / agreement to support the
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Commission's mischaracterization of the agreement as a LSSA that would be subject to approval
under Idaho Code §72-404.
The express purpose of the agreement was to provide the Claimant with the full measure
all benefits that he would be entitled to under the Act including, but not limited to, "total and

permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law":
The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for
and to be paid hereunder are the full measure of benefits Claimant would be
entitled to receive if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found
to be liable for future medical care causally related to the industrial injury, for
permanent partial impairment benefits and for total and permanent disability
income benefits pursuant to law. (See ,r20 of the stipulation approved by the
Commission in its 6.26.14 Order) (italics supplied).
The provisions of the Act which obligate Employer / Surety and the ISIF to provide the
Claimant with the full measure of his total and permanent disability benefits are Idaho Code §72408 and Idaho Code §72-409. At the time when the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14
Order approving the compensation agreement of the parties, those code provision did not give
the Industrial Commission jurisdiction to grant Employer / Surety an illegal credit for PPI
benefits previously paid by Employer / Surety. Therefore, the Industrial Commission acted
beyond the scope of its limited jurisdiction when it approved the illegal credit and the
Commission must set aside those provisions of the agreement which "do not conform to the
provisions of this law":
An agreement shall be approved by the commission only when the terms conform
to the provisions ofthis law. See Idaho Code §72-711 (italics supplied).
Since the stipulation/ agreement did not conform to the provisions of Idaho Code §72408 and Idaho Code §72-409, the Commission did not have jurisdiction to approve the illegal
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PPI credit that was granted to Employer / Surety and should enter an Order On Reconsideration
which declares the illegal PPI credit void and unenforceable.
(3)

THE PHRASE SUBJECT TO THE CREDIT IS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT LEADS
TO COMPLETELY DIFFERENT OUTCOMES WHEN APPLIED TO EACH
DEFENDANT AND DEPRIVES THE CLAIMANT OF THE FULL MEASURE OF
HIS TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS
The stated purpose of the Compensation Agreement approved by the Commission on

6.26.14 was to provide the Claimant with the full measure of his statutory total and permanent
disability benefits beginning on IO .1.13 and continuing each month thereafter for the rest of his
life based on the statutory rate of 45% of the AWSW:
Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is entitled to be paid total and pennanent
disability benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average weekly state wage
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 72-408 and 72-409 (See !11 of stipulation).
The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for
and to be paid hereunder are the fall measure of benefits Claimant would be
entitled to receive if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found
to be liable for future medical care causally related to the industrial injury, for
permanent partial impairment benefits and for total and permanent disability
income benefits pursuant to law. (See 120 of the stipulation approved by the
Commission in its 6.26.14 Order) (italics supplied).
The fundamental payment obligations of the agreement are not ambiguous. Beginning on
10.1.13, the Claimant is entitled to receive the full measure of his statutory total and permanent
disability benefits each month for the rest of his life at 45% of the A WSW pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409.
The ambiguity which is at the crux of this matter is only created when the Defendants and
the Commission inconsistently apply the phrase "subject to the credit described in paragraph 12,
below" to Defendant Employer and to Defendant ISIF's obligation to pay total and permanent
disability benefits.
Davis I Petitioner's Briefln Support of Motion For.Reconsideration of Order on Declaratory Ruling
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According to the Defendants and the Commission, when the phrase "subject to the credit"
set forth in paragraph 11 is applied to the Employer, it means that the Employer's obligation to
pay the Claimant total and permanent disability benefits terminates 90 weeks after 10 .1.13.
However, when the identical phrase in paragraph 11 is applied to the ISIF, it means that the
ISIF's obligation to begin paying the Claimant the full measure of his total and permanent
disability benefits does not begin until 250 weeks after 10.1.13. These inconsistent outcomes
could not be achieved if the subject phrase were not ambiguous; i.e., the identical phrase means 2
different things when applied to 2 different Defendants.
When the inconsistent application of the same exact phrase leads to 2 completely
different outcomes when applied to different Defendants and those different outcomes deprive
the Claimant of the full measure of his total and permanent disability benefits for a period of 160
weeks from week 90 to week 250, then it should be obvious that the phrase is ambiguous. The
question of whether a compensation agreement is ambiguous is a question of law.
The 1976 compensation agreement, however, is a Woodvine type "and/or"
agreement which, in the Woodvine case, we held could be construed to be
ambiguous. Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263
(1984). While "[d]etermination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a
question of law," Delancey v. Delancey, 110 Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34
(1986), "[i]nterpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact."
Id. Accord Woodvine. Thus, the interpretation of the 1976 compensation
agreement was a question of fact which, if raised, should have been decided by
the Commission. Since it is arguable that the ambiguity issue was reserved as a
result of the stipulation of the parties, we remand the matter to the Commission to
resolve the ambiguity question involved in the 1976 agreement. Fowler v. City of
Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 6, 773 P.2d 269,274 (1988).
The Industrial Commission has resolved this question of law by concluding that the
phrase "subject to the credit" is not ambiguous:
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We find that the LSSA is not ambiguous, and that the responsibility of the ISIF to
assume exclusive responsibility for the payment of statutory benefits for total and
permanent disability does not begin until after the expiration of 250 weeks
subsequent to October 1, 2013 (See p. 12 of 10.6.15 Order on Petition For
Declaratory Ruling).
The Industrial Commission's conclusion that the document is not ambiguous does not
make any sense. If the document was not ambiguous, then application of the phrase "subject to
the credit" would not lead to 2 completely different outcomes when applied to each Defendant
and deprive the Claimant of 160 weeks of total and permanent disability benefits from week 90
to week 250.
The Commission found also found that the interpretation of the Compensation
Agreement suggested by Petitioner was not supported by the language of the document:
We do not believe the LSSA contemplates the outcome suggested by Petitioner.
Paragraph 11 of the LSSA clearly contemplates that despite whatever credit may
be taken by the Employer, ISIF's responsibility to pay 100% of Petitioner's
statutory benefits does not commence until the expiration of 250 weeks
subsequent to October 1, 2013 (See p. 13 of 10.6.15 Order On Petition For
Declaratory Ruling).
The outcome suggested by the Petitioner is that the Compensation Agreement requires
the Defendants to pay Claimant his statutory total and permanent disability benefits at the
statutory rate of 45% of the A WSW beginning on 10.1.13 and continuing each month thereafter
for the balance of Petitioner's life just like the document states:
Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is entitled to be paid total and
permanent disability benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average weekly state
wage pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 72-408 and 72-409 (See Yl l of stipulation)
(italics supplied).
The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for
and to be paid hereunder are the full measure of benefits Claimant would be
entitled to receive if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found
to be liable for future medical care causally related to the industrial injury, for
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permanent partial impairment benefits and for total and permanent disability
income benefits pursuant to law. (See ,r20 of the stipulation approved by the
Commission in its 6.26.14 Order) (italics supplied).
Since the outcome suggested by Petitioner is expressly stated as the fundamental purpose
of the agreement, it is difficult to fathom how the Commission can reach the conclusion that the
document does not contemplate the outcome advanced by Petitioner.

The Commission's

interpretation of the Compensation Agreement is not only unreasonable because it completely
overlooks the stated purpose of he agreement, it is also unreasonable because the Commission
fails to apply the phrase "subject to the credit" to the ISIF's payment obligation. This is a clear
misinterpretation of the agreement. The plain language of paragraph 11 clearly states that the
ISIF' s obligation to pay statutory total and permanent disability benefits is subject to the credit:
At the expiration of said 250 week period, subiect to the credit discussed in
paragraph 12, below, the ISIF will pay Claimant his full statutory income
benefits, said amount being 45% of the then prevailing average state weekly
wage, until Claimant's death (See !11 of agreement) (italics supplied).
When the phrase "subject to the credit" is used to qualify or explain the ISIF' s payment
obligation, it can only mean that the phrase accelerates the commencement of the ISIF's payment
obligation from week 250 down to week 90. Otherwise, the phrase is meaningless and mere
surplusage. As a basic matter of contract construction, the phrase "subject to the credit" should
be applied to both Defendants consistently and the Commission should enter an Order On
Reconsideration which clearly states that the ISIP has an obligation to pay total and permanent
disability benefits to the Claimant at the statutory rate of 45% of the A WSW beginning 90 weeks
after 10.1.13 because its payment obligation was "subject to the credit" discussed in paragraph
12.
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CONCLUSION
As a general concept, the Claimant understands why the finality principle embodied in
Idaho Code §72-718 is important to the orderly administration of justice. However, the finality
principle embodied in Idaho Code §72-718 and the doctrine of res judicata can only be applied to
valid final judgments. When the Industrial Commission acts beyond its limited jurisdiction and
approves an invalid agreement that grants an illegal credit that is not authorized by Idaho Code
§72-408 or Idaho Code §72-409, then we are not dealing with a valid final judgment and the
principle of finality must yield to the Commission's obligation to set aside an invalid agreement
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711:
A reading of the findings and conclusions indicates the Commission was
erroneously under the impression that the doctrine of res judicata precludes any
consideration of the applicability ofl.C. § 72-719(3) in the absence of either fraud
or change of condition. Res judicata prevents only the relitigation of matters
finally decided in an earlier decision of the Commission. Here the statute clearly
over-rides that concept of finality, permitting the Commission to reopen its earlier
decision if it fmds it necessary to do so to correct a manifest injustice. Banzhaf v.
Carnation Co., 104 Idaho 700, 703, 662 P.2d 1144, 1177 (1983).
Idaho Code §72-318 specifically states that any agreement which relieves the Employer
of its obligation to pay full compensation or requires the Claimant to waive his right to full
compensation is invalid. Idaho Code §72-711 clearly states that the Industrial Commission can
only approve compensation agreements which conform to the provisions of the Act. These
concepts, which require the Industrial Commission to declare invalid agreements that violate the
Act void, must override the concept of finality.
Even if the Commission disregards its obligation to set aside those provisions of an
invalid agreement which grant an illegal credit not authorized by any provision of the workers'
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compensation Act, the Commission should consistently apply the ambiguous phrase "subject to
the credit" to both Defendants and require the ISIF to begin paying Claimant the full measure of
his total and permanent disability benefits at 45% of the A WSW 90 weeks after 10.1.13 pursuant
to Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409 and paragraphs 11 and 12 of the parties'
Compensation Agreement.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of October, 2015.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

By:]~

RICK b,l(ALLAS
Attorney for Petitioner/ Claimant

Certificate of Service

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of October 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of Petitioner's Brief in Support of Motion For Reconsideration of Order On
Petition For Declaratory Ruling by the method indicated below upon the following persons:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

[ X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile@ 208.888.2789

Jon M. Bauman
Elam& Burke
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.384.5844
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Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
78 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680
Telephone: (208) 888-2790
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STATE OF IDAHO

********
GARY DAVIS,
Claimant,
vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer,
and

LC. 15-000107
(2005-50 I 080)

ISIF RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S
OCTOBER 6, 2015 ORDER ON
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RULING

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIP") by
and through undersigned counsel of record and hereby responds to Petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration and Brief in Support thereof.
ISIF RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL
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Initially, it must be noted that the Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
offers nothing new by way of analysis or authority in support of Claimant's position. The
Motion for Reconsideration and Brief in Support simply rehash the arguments presented
in the Petition for Declaratory Ruling, all of which were fully addressed by the Industrial
Commission in its Order denying the Petition.
Claimant continues to rehash the "credit" argument with respect to the ISIP
liability. As the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants unambiguously
provides, and as the Commission held in its Order on Petition for Declaration Ruling, the
ISIF liability to Claimant included the differential between the Claimant's statutory
disability benefit rate of 45% and the prevailing average weekly state wage for year of
injury owed by the Employer and Surety pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and §72-409.
This is a very rare occurrence in ISIP liability cases. Because the date of Claimant's
MMI was 9 years from the date of his industrial injury, the increase in the benefit rate
payable even to a 45% rate Claimant was in excess of the 2004 55% of the average
weekly state wage rate. Accordingly, and beginning with the MMI date of October 1,
2013, the ISIF was liable for, and acknowledged in the Stipulation, that it would pay to
Claimant the differential rate throughout the 250 weeks of the agreed upon obligation to
the Employer and Surety. The "credit" therefore recognized that the 160 week credit to
the Surety for impairment paid did not eliminate the ISIP liability for the differential
during the 250 weeks of total and permanent disability benefits which were the liability
of the Surety.
The Commission correctly held in its Order that the ISIP liability for the full
measure of Claimant's statutory benefits would not and did not accrue until the expiration
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of the entire 250 weeks apportioned to the Employer and Surety. The Claimant's
arguments to the contrary are devoid of cogent analysis or supporting authority.
The Motion for Reconsideration should be denied on the grounds and for the
reasons set forth in the Commission's Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed
October 6, 2015.
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2015.
MALLEA LAW OFFICES

~J-r~

Kenneth L. Mallei
Attorney for ISIP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
· I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of November, 2015, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document was served via U.S. Mail to the following:
Rick D. Kallas
1031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, ID 83712
Attorney for Claimant
JonM. Bauman
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Attorney for Employer/Surety

.~~

Kenneth L. Mallea
Attorney for Defendant ISIP
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Jon M. Bauman
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Bauman - ISB #2989
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Attorney for Defendants, Employer and Surety

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
Claimant,
vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.
Employer,

LC. No. 05-501080
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S RESPONSE
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S OCTOBER
6, 2015 ORDER ON PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.
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Defendants Employer and Surety, by and through Elam & Burke, P.A., their attorneys of
record, hereby respond as follows to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Industrial
Commission's October 6, 2015 Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling dated October 23, 2015
("Motion for Reconsideration").
The Motion for Reconsideration is not well taken. Pursuant to Rule 3, J.R.P., a motion
"shall ... set forth the relief or order sought." The Motion for Reconsideration merely asks the
Industrial Commission to reconsider its ruling of October 6, 2015 on the Petition for Declaratory
Ruling. The motion fails to set forth the relief or order sought.
The Motion for Reconsideration fails to raise any new arguments not already raised
previously. The Industrial Commission has held on numerous occasions that it is not inclined to
re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply because the case was not
resolved in a party's favor. Oakes v. Coeur d'Alene School District No. 271, 2015 IIC 0034
(08/07/2015); Federko v. Sun Valley Co., 2011 IIC 0034 (06/03/2011).
The Motion for Reconsideration, like Claimant's Petition for Declaratory Ruling and
supporting briefs, asks the Industrial Commission to reopen a case that was dismissed with
prejudice before the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc.,
157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150 (2014). Petitioner did not seek reconsideration or appeal from
the Industrial Commission's decision approving the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against
Defendants. In its Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, the Industrial Commission set forth
cogent reasons why Petitioner's request should be denied. Petitioner offers no new legal or
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factual matter that would call into question the Industrial Commission's ruling or the basis for
that ruling.
Petitioner also argues that the Industrial Commission should retroactively apply the
decision in Corgatelli to invalidate the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants. As
the Industrial Commission pointed out, however, "We conclude that there is yet no way to
retroactively apply the rule of Corgatelli to past LSSAs and past decisions of the Commission.
The Commission would do little else but revisit many thousands of long-resolved claims were
that the case." Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, p. 12. Petitioner does not assert any
basis for reconsidering these assertions because none exists.
Nevertheless, Petitioner has resorted to circular argument by suggesting that somehow,
the Corgatelli decision, if applied retroactively, would preclude the Industrial Commission from
approving the Stipulation for Entry of A ward Against Defendants. There is no limit to the
number of possibilities one can imagine if one were allowed to travel backward in time. Not
content with this flawed reasoning, however, Petitioner also appears to suggest, once again, that
somehow the Employer and Surety and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund had advance
knowledge of how the Idaho Supreme Court would rule in Corgatelli. The suggestion is
unreasonable, based as it is on nothing but conjecture. In fact, the undersigned had no idea what
issues the Idaho Supreme Court would ultimately address in Corgatelli, and no idea how those
issues would be resolved. The Industrial Commission noted that "it must be acknowledged that
had the parties been pre-aware of the holding in that case [Corgatelli], the LSSA would look
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different than the one approved by the Commission." Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling,
p. 11.
Defendants Employer and Surety concur in the ISIF Response to Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's October 6, 2015 Order on Petition for
Declaratory Ruling. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration shoul

Respectfully submitted this* day ofNovembe,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4., day of November, 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing in~ent to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Rick D. Kallas
& DEFRANCO, PLLC
1031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, Idaho 83712

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS

--2::_

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES

78 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

4849-3669-5850, V.
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
Claimant,
Petitioner herein,

IC 15-000107
(2005-501080)

V.

HAMMACK MANAGEMENT INC.,
Employer,
and

ORDER DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,

FILED

and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Respondents herein.
On October 6, 2015, the Commission entered its Order on Petition for Declaratory
Ruling.

On October 23, 2015, Petitioner filed his timely motion for reconsideration, with

supporting memoranda. Defendants Employer/Surety and ISIP filed timely responses. For the
reasons set forth in more detail below, the Commission declines to reconsider its October 6, 2015
Order.
In its October 6, 2015 Decision, the Commission observed that while the provisions of
Idaho Code§ 72-719 do afford limited opportunities to re-visit an award of the Commission, that
section was not relevant to resolution of the instant matter since the provisions of Idaho Code
§ 72-719 do not apply where there has been a settlement pursuant to the provisions of Idaho

Code§ 72-404. (See Idaho Code§ 72-719(4)). Idaho Code§ 72-404 provides:
Whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interest of all parties,
the liability of the employer for compensation may, on application to the
commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or in part by the
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1
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payment of one or more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the
comm1ss10n.
Such agreements, commonly referred to as lump sum settlement agreements, contemplate the
compromise of a claim by the payment of "one or more lump sums". Here, the agreement at
issue does not contemplate the payment of one or more lump sums in compromise of
Defendants' liability. Rather, the agreement contemplates the payment of all benefits to which
Claimant would be entitled as though adjudged permanently and totally disabled by the
Commission. The issue resolved by the agreement was not whether Claimant is totally and
permanently disabled, and not whether the ISIF bears some responsibility for the payment of
total and permanent disability benefits. Rather, the issue resolved by the agreement was how
that responsibility should be apportioned between the Employer and the ISIP. The agreement is
silent as to whether it is submitted to the Industrial Commission pursuant to the provisions of
Idaho Code § 72-404 or Idaho Code § 72-711. Likewise, the Commission's order approving the
settlement is silent as to whether it is approved pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-404, Idaho Code §
72-711, or some other authority. Petitioner argues that since the agreement does not call for the
payment of a lump sum or sums, the agreement is more appropriately characterized as a
"compensation agreement" under Idaho Code § 72-711.

Assuming, without deciding, that

Petitioner is correct in this characterization, the Commission concludes that this would not
change the outcome in this matter.
First, even though Idaho Code § 72-711 compensation agreements may be re-visited
pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 72-719(c) (Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9,644 P.2d 311
(1982); Banzhafv. Carnation Co., 104 Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983)), the fact remains that
the limited review afforded by the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-719 is only available within
five years following the date of the accident giving rise to the claim. The stipulation of the
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parties reflects that the subject accident occurred on November 9, 2004. Therefore, per Idaho
Code § 72-719, the time within which to challenge an award of the Commission for change of
condition, fraud, or to correct a manifest injustice, has long passed. Idaho Code § 72-719 cannot
disturb the finality of the Commission's June 26, 2014 Order approving the settlement
agreement, even if that agreement is characterized as a "compensation agreement" under Idaho
Code § 72-711.
Next, the Commission concludes that even if it be assumed that the settlement agreement
is best characterized as an Idaho Code § 72-711 compensation agreement, the agreement would
not receive different treatment under the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-318 than it would if it is
more appropriately characterized as an Idaho Code§ 72-404 agreement. The agreement does not
waive Petitioner's rights to compensation under the Act.

Rather, by the subject agreement,

Defendants and Petitioner merely agreed to resolve the specific claim for benefits at issue in this
case. See Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005). Further, we find that if
the agreement is best characterized as an Idaho Code § 72-711 agreement, it still passes muster
under Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009),
vis-a-vis the ISIF.
Finally, Petitioner argues that there is specific statutory language in Idaho Code § 72-711
which imposes an additional obligation on the Commission which is not imposed by the
provisions ofldaho Code § 72-404. Idaho Code § 72-711 provides:
If the employer and the afflicted employee reach an agreement in regard to
compensation under this law, a memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with
the commission, and, if approved by it, thereupon the memorandum shall for all
purposes be an award by the commission and be enforceable under the provisions
of section 72-735, unless modified as provided in section 72-719. An agreement
shall be approved by the commission only when the terms conform to the
provisions of this law.
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Therefore, where the terms of the compensation agreement do not "conform to the provisions of
this law", the Commission is without authority to approve such a settlement. Petitioner argues
that as illustrated by Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) the
"credit" taken in the agreement is illegal under Idaho workers' compensation law and has been
illegal ever since the statutory scheme was enacted.

Therefore, the Commission was not

authorized to approve the settlement in question, even though the settlement was approved prior
the issuance of Corgatelli, supra. We disagree with the premise that it has always been contrary
to Idaho law to allow the type of credit at issue in this case. As the Commission went to some
lengths to explain in the Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, it is implicit in the landmark
decision of Carey v. Clearwater Road Dep 't, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) that the type of
credit at issue in this case, is not only allowed, but anticipated by the apportionment scheme
adopted by the Court in that decision. While the Court has now ruled that such "credits" are
inapposite to its construction of the statutory scheme, and while we are constrained to apply that
construction prospectively, we decline to do so retroactively.

Nor has Petitioner cited the

Commission to any authority which would support the retroactive application of the Corgatelli
Court's construction of the statutory scheme. Finally, it is possible that the Corgatelli Court did
not intend the broad interpretation that the Commission has given to that case. For this reason as
well, we decline to apply it in the fashion urged by Petitioner, without receiving further direction
from the Court.

An appeal of this decision would afford Petitioner the opportunity to test

whether the Commission's interpretation of Corgatelli is correct, and if so, whether the
Commission has erred in failing to retroactively apply that rule not only to this settlement
agreement, but to all past settlement agreements and decisions of the Commission which endorse
the taking of a similar credit.
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For the reasons stated above the Commission continues to adhere to its original decision.
'7
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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Thdmas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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t::)""
, ,, I ,.
I hereby certify that on the CX,5 day of tJo\J-l/u...tLI//
, 2015, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was served by
regular United States Mail upon each of the following:

RICK D KALLAS
1031 EPARKBLVD
BOISE ID 83712
KENNETH L MALLEA
PO BOX 857
MERIDIAN ID 83680
JONMBAUMAN
PO BOX 1539
BOISE ID 83701-1539
ka
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Rick D. Kallas
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
E-mail:
rdk@greyhawklaw.com
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Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
Claimant / Petitioner / Appellant,
I.C. No. 2005 - 501080
vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Employer,
Filing Fee: $94.00
[Rule 23(a)(3) I.A.R.J

and
IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants / Respondents.
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TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS / RESPONDENTS, HAMMACK
MANAGEMENT, INC., AND THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, AND
THEIR ATTORNEY, JON BAUMAN, AND TO THE STATE OF IDAHO
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, AND THEIR ATTORNEY,
KENNETH MALLEA, AND TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Claimant / Petitioner / Appellant, Gary Davis, appeals against the above
named Defendants / Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court against the Industrial
Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For Declaratory Ruling and 11.25.15 Order
Denying Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration.

2.

The Claimant / Petitioner / Appellant has the right to appeal from the above described orders
because the Orders described above are final and appealable Orders pursuant to Rule 11 (d)

I.AR.
3.

Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal:

(a)

Did the Industrial Commission exceed the limited jurisdiction granted to it by the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Act when it entered its 6.26.14 Order granting Employer an
invalid credit for PPI benefits previously paid against its obligation to pay Claimant the
full measure of his total and permanent disability benefits even though such a credit is not
authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409?

(b)

Did the Industrial Commission err by not applying the holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West,

Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) retroactively to its 6.26.14 Order of Approval
and Discharge and declaring the PPI credit granted to Employer void?
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(c)

Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that its 6.26.14 Order should not be
declared void and set aside pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711 even though it granted
Employer an invalid PPI credit not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code
§72-409 which did not conform to the provisions of the workers' compensation act?

(d)

Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that its 6.26.14 Order should not be
declared void and set aside pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(1) even though it granted
Employer an invalid PPI credit not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code
§72-409 which relieved Employer in whole or in part from its liability to pay the
Claimant the full measure of his statutory total and permanent disability benefits?

(e)

Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that its 6.26.14 Order should not be
declared void and set aside pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(2) even though it granted
Employer an invalid PPI credit not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code
§72-409 which required the Claimant to unlawfully waive his right to receive the full
measure of his statutory total and permanent disability benefits?

(f)

Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that the "subject to the credit" language
of the stipulation was not ambiguous when it defined the date when the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund is obligated to begin paying Claimant the full measure of his statutory
total and permanent disability benefits?

(g)

Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that the Claimant is not entitled to an
award of attorney's fees from Employer and ISIP pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 even
though both Employer and the ISIP contested the Claimant's claim for the full measure of
his total and permanent disability benefits without reasonable grounds in direct violation
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of the express language of the stipulation and Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72409?
4.

No portion of the record has been sealed by order of the Commission or a Court.

5.

The Claimant/ Petitioner/ Respondent does not request a transcript of the proceedings
below because the Industrial Commission's 6.26.14 Order of Approval and Discharge
was entered by the Industrial Commission based on a Stipulation For Entry of Award
Against Defendants and there was no hearing before the Industrial Commission.

6.

The Claimant I Petitioner/ Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the
Industrial Commission's/ agency's record in addition to those automatically included under
Rule 28, I.A.R:

(a)

The 6.26.14 Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants and the corresponding
Order of Approval and Discharge entered by the Industrial Commission on 6.26.14;

(b)

Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 2.26.15 Petition For Declaratory Ruling;

(c)

Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 2.26.15 Affidavit In Support of Petition For
Declaratory Ruling;

(d)

Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 2.26.15 Memorandum in Support of Petition For
Declaratory Ruling including Exhibits 1 - 5;

(e)

Defendant Employer's 3.11.15 Objection and Response to Claimant's Petition For
Declaratory Ruling Which Interprets and Clarifies the Stipulation For Entry of Award
Against Defendants and Order of Approval and Discharge entered by the Industrial
Commission on 6.26.14;
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(:t)

Defendant ISIF's 3.11.15 Limited Appearance To Challenge Subject Matter Jurisdiction
and Service of Process;

(g)

Claimant/ Petitioner I Appellant's 3.17.15 Consolidated Reply Memorandum in Support
of Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling;

(h)

The Industrial Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For Declaratory Ruling;

(i)

Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 10.23.15 Motion For Reconsideration of the Industrial
Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For Declaratory Ruling;

(j)

Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 10.23.15 Brief in Support of Motion For
Reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For
Declaratory Ruling;

(k)

Defendant ISIF's 11.2.15 Response To Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration of the
Industrial Commission's 10.6.15 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling;

(I)

Defendant Employer's 11.4.15 Response To Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration of
the Industrial Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For Declaratory Ruling; and,

(m)

Industrial Commission's 11.25.15 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion For
Reconsideration.

7.

Claimant I Petitioner I Appellant requests that Exhibits 1 - 5 submitted with the
Claimant's Memorandum In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling be included in
the Industrial Commission's administrative agency's record on appeal.

8.

I certify:
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(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal does not have to be served on any reporter because the
parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled and the Industrial
Commission did not have to conduct a hearing so there is no transcript to order.

(b)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

Respectfully submitted this 31st day of December, 2015.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

By: _ _ _- - = = : ; - - - - - " - - - ~ ~ ' - - - - - : : ; t , ' ~ - - RICK D. KALLAS -Attom~~;;J
Attorney for Claimant
Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of December, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of Claimant / Petitioner I Appellant's Notice of Appeal by the method indicated
below upon the following persons:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680

[ X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile @ 208.888.2789

Jon M. Bauman
Elam & Burke
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile@ 208.384.5844
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
GARY DAVIS,
Claimant-Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO.

V.

HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., Employer,
and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety,
and STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,

----

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
OF GARY DAVIS

Defendants-Respondents.
Appeal From:

Industrial Commission Chairman R.D. Maynard presiding.

Case Number:

IC 15-000107 (IC 2005-501080)

Order Appealed from:

ORDER ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING
ENTERED OCTOBER 6, 2015 and ORDER DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ENTERED NOVEMBER 25, 2015

Attorney for Appellant:

RICK D. KALLAS
1031 E. PARK BOULEVARD
BOISE, ID 83712-7722

Attorney for Respondents:

JON M. BAUMAN
P.O. BOX 1539
BOISE, ID 83701
KENNETH L. MALLEA
P.O.BOX857
MERIDIAN, ID 83680

Appealed By:

GARY DAVIS, Claimant

Appealed Against:

HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC. and IDAHO STATE
INSURANCE FUND and STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND

Notice of Appeal Filed:

DECEMBER 31, 2015

Appellate Fee Paid:

$94.00 SC Fee paid & $100 Industfja,l,CQJIBllission deposit paid

Reporter/Transcript:

No reporter; no hearing h °'-~.th~,tt~"o..nd no transcript.
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CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL

I, DENA K. BURKE , the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission
of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of
the NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED DECEMBER 31, 2015; THE COMMISSION'S
ORDER ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING ENTERED OCTOBER 6, 2015
and

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ENTERED NOVEMBER 25, 2015, herein, and the whole thereof, in IC case number

15-000107 (2005-50 I 080) for Claimant GARY DAVIS.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official
seal of said Commission this

31 sr

day of DECEMBER, 2015.
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Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
78 SW 5th A venue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680
Telephone: (208) 888-2790
Fax: (208) 888-2789
Email: klm@mallealaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 2397

,.
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Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant
State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO

********
GARY DAVIS,
Claimant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent,
vs.
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer/Respondent,

LC. No. 2005-501080

and

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety/Respondent,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendant/Respondent/CrossAppellant.
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENT, GARY DAVIS, AND
HIS ATTORNEY, RICK D. KALLAS, 1031 E. Park Boulevard, Boise, ID 83712 AND
RESPONDENTS HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC. and STATE INSURANCE
FUND AND THEIR ATTORNEY, JON BAUMAN, P.O. Box 1539, Boise, ID 83701
AND THE CLERK OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named cross-appellant, STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL

SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, appeals against the above-named cross-respondent,
GARY DAVIS, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Idaho Industrial Commission's
October 6, 2015 Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling and November 25, 2015 Order
Denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
2.

That the party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and

the judgments or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and
pursuant to I.A.R., Rule 11 (d).
3.

Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal:
a.

Whether the Industrial Commission had subject matter jurisdiction

over the Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed in this case?
b.

Whether a Petition for Declaratory Ruling under JRP 15 may allow

a party to subsequently challenge by appeal the merits of a stipulated settlement and order
of approval where no motion for reconsideration or appeal had previously been taken?
c.

Whether a final order on a petition for declaratory ruling may

extend the time for appeal on the merits of a case that had been dismissed with prejudice
16 months earlier?

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2
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d.

Does a party have the right by application of JRP 15, to directly

appeal a ruling in a subsequent proceeding with the same parties and issues that were
previously dismissed with prejudice?
e.
4.

Does JRP 15, as applied in this case, violate I.C. §72-718?

The cross-appellant requests the following documents to be included in the

Industrial Commission's/agency's record in addition to those automatically included
under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated by the appellant in the initial notice of appeal:
None.
5.

I certify:
a.

That the cross-appellant is exempt from paying any clerk's fee or

filing fee because cross-appellant is an agency of the State ofldaho.
b.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January /

J, 2016

2~~

Kenneth L. Mallea
Attorney for Cross-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/1,-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the K_ day of January, 2016, a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon:
Rick D. Kallas
1031 East Park Boulevard
Boise, ID 83 712
Attorney for Claimant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent
Jon M. Bauman
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Attorney for Employer/Surety
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,
Appellant/Cross Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO.

V.

HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Employer, and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, Surety,

CERTIFICATE OF
CROSS APPEAL

Respondents/Cross Respondents,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Respondent/Cross Appellant.

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
RD. Maynard, Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 15-000107 (2015-501080)

Order Appealed from:

Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, filed
October 6, 2015 and Order Denying Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, filed November 25,
2015. (Copies of these documents were sent to the
Court on December 31, 2015 with the Ceritificate of
Appeal)

Attorney for Appellant/Cross Respondent:

Rick D. Kallas
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83 712-7722
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Attorney for Respondents/
Cross Respondents:

Jon M. Bauman
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

Attorney for Respondent/Cross Appellant:

Kenneth L. Mallea
PO Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680

Cross Appeal By:

Respondent/Cross Appellant, ISIF

Appealed Against:

Appellant/Cross Respondent, Gary Davis and
Respondents/Cross Respondents, Hammack
Management, Inc., Employer, and Idaho State
Insurance Fund, Surety.

Notice of Cross/Appeal Filed:

January 13, 2016

Appellate Fee Paid:

The Cross Appellant is exempt from paying fees.

Name of Reporter:

No hearing was held in this matter.

Dated:

January 15, 2016

Assistant Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Cross-Appeal, and the whole thereof, in IC case number
15-000107 (2015-501080) for Gary Davis.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission this 15th day of January, 2016.

CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL - GARY DAVIS - 1

157

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court
No. 43863 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly
listed in the List of Exhibits.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2016.
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GARY DAVIS,

Appellant/Cross Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO. 43863
NOTICE OF COMPLETION

V.

HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., Employer,
and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Respondents/Cross Respondents,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Respondent/Cross Appellant.

TO:

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Courts;
Rick D. Kallas for the Appellant/Cross Respondent;
Jon M. Bauman for the Respondents/Cross Respondents; and
Kenneth Mallea for the Respondent/Cross Appellant.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Attorney for Appellant/Cross Respondent:
Rick D. Kallas
1031 E Park Blvd
Boise, ID 83 712
Attorney for Respondents/Cross Respondents:
Jon M. Bauman
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - GARY DAVIS 43863 - 1
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Attorney for Respondent/Cross Appellant:
Kenneth Mallea
PO Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.

In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this 8th day of February, 2015.

Assistant Commission Secretary
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